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“Excessive judicial revision of an overbroad statute may lead to vagueness problems because ‘the 
statutory language would signify one thing but, as a matter of judicial decision, would stand for 
something entirely different. Under those circumstances, persons of ordinary intelligence reading 
the law could not know what it actually meant.’ ”1 
“In responding to the felt necessities of the time2 and the stated or perceived needs of the public, the 
legislature must draft legislation whose tentacles of proscription do not exceed constitutional 
commands. Neither the trial court nor this Court should graft onto the challenged statutes judicial 
limitations that will not be apparent to the citizenry. After all, citizens should regulate their behavior 
according to the plain meaning of precisely drafted statutes, not according to their guesses about 
saving judicial construction.”3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: OVERBREADTH AND THE PROBLEM OF FEDERALISM 
 
A law is unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment if it regulates 
substantially more speech than the Constitution allows to be regulated,4 and, with some 
exceptions,5 if a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can argue that it would 
be unconstitutional as applied to others.6 This judge-made procedural rule, known as the 
Overbreadth Doctrine, was adopted in its current form by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma.7 The Overbreadth Doctrine holds that those defendants whose speech is not 
constitutionally protected can nonetheless move to facially invalidate the law on behalf of third 
parties whose speech may be chilled by the law in question.8 The doctrine turns the unprotected 
                                                 
1 People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 487, (N.Y. 2014) (alterations omitted) (quoting People v. Dietze, 549 
N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (N.Y. 1989)). 
2 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1882) 
3 Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 351 S.E.2d 305, 331 (1986) (Becton, J., dissenting) 
4 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 614 (1973). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of 
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991). 
5 The second prong of the overbreadth rule has been called into question recently. See U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 
473 n. 3 (2010) (disagreeing with the dissenting opinion of Alito, J., that “because there has not been a ruling on the 
validity of the statute as applied to Stevens, our consideration of his facial overbreadth claim is premature”). For 
most of its history, however, the overbreadth doctrine has been heavily disfavored if not outright barred in as applied 
challenges. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008); Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting 
Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999) (noting that the overbreadth doctrine should only be employed as “a last 
resort,” i.e., when an as applied challenge would not succeed). 
6  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 614. 
7 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
8 See id. 
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speaker into a proxy for unknown citizens whose would-be protected speech is potentially 
chilled and who would thus never have the opportunity to come before the Court. 
Like most constitutional doctrines, overbreadth analysis is not required by any plain 
reading of the Constitutional text.9 Nor can it be implied from the original understandings of the 
framers.10 It is a prophylactic common law rule designed to give effect to a core constitutional 
provision, based on modern understandings of that provision. In that respect, the Overbreadth 
Doctrine is analogous to the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule (which gives effect to the 
Warrants Clause) and the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda11 rule (which gives effect to the Self-
Incrimination Clause).12 
However, overbreadth analysis is different from these other prophylactic doctrines in that 
it is fundamentally concerned with written statutes. The exclusionary rule and the Miranda rule, 
of course, simply restrict the actions of individual state actors. Written statutes raise the issue of 
statutory interpretation, which are governed by the rules of federalism. 
State courts are not bound by the Supreme Court on issues of overbreadth.13 In our 
federalist system, state supreme courts get the final say on the meaning and interpretation of their 
                                                 
9 See U.S. Const. Am. I (“Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech…) 
10 See generally Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) 
(arguing that the framers understood the First Amendment to, at most, prohibit prior restraint, and that nearly all 
First Amendment case law since 1919 is a radical departure from that original understanding). 
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
12 See Overbreadth and Listeners' Rights, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1749, 1754 (2010) (“It is useful to contrast the chilling 
effects approach with another area in which the Court has created a prophylactic rule to protect constitutional 
values--the exclusionary rule. Some commentators have argued that the exclusionary rule is analogous to 
overbreadth doctrine”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 870 
(1991) (The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is similar in substance and effect”). 
13 See Fallon, supra n. 12, at 861-862. Fallon observes that “[a] fundamental premise of constitutional federalism 
holds that state law is what the state courts say it is. Thus, whether a state statute actually is overbroad, whether it 
means what it seems to say or something less than that, is a state law question on which state courts have the last 
word. Moreover, a related deep premise of constitutional federalism affirms that state courts not only can, but 
should, offer narrowing constructions of state statutes to confine their reach within constitutional bounds. This 
premise reflects a sort of federalistic quid pro quo. Asked of the states is a conscientious effort to shape their law to 
federal constitutional requirements. Accorded to the states is the flexibility to develop state law through a 
legislative/judicial partnership, in which the legislature can leave it to the state courts to dot its i's, cross its t's, and 
excise its constitutional excesses.” Id. 
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states’ statutes, and so the United States Supreme Court cannot permanently facially invalidate a 
state statute on overbreadth grounds.14 If the Supreme Court strikes down a state law as 
overbroad, that law is not stricken from the books but rather enters a state of limbo until and 
unless the state supreme court sufficiently narrows its interpretation of the law.15 In other words, 
“[w]hat an ‘invalidated’ statute means is a state law question; and whether the state court can and 
should change its interpretation in light of a Supreme Court overbreadth holding is also a state 
law question.”16  
To make matters worse, the Court’s 1991 ruling in Osborne v. Ohio17 implicitly invited 
states to craft artificial narrowing constructions.18 Shortly after that case was decided, one 
concerned author argued that “unless clear legislative intent can be discerned, state courts should 
invalidate overbroad speech laws rather than attempt to narrow them.”19 Sixteen years later, it is 
not yet clear whether courts have heeded that advice, or whether that concern was well-
founded.20 
How often do state courts engage in such artificial narrowing of state statutes? Are there 
any similarities in how they engage in such narrowing? And even if the practice is widespread, 
                                                 
14 See id. 
15 See Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for 
Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382 (2002). 
16 Fallon, supra n. 12, at 854. 
17 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
18 See Christopher P. Lu, The Role of State Courts in Narrowing Overbroad Speech Laws After Osborne v. Ohio, 28 
Harv. J. on Legis. 253, 255 (1991) (noting that “hidden” in the Osborne decision is an implicit invitation to state 
courts to engage in substantial narrowing of overbroad speech laws). 
19 Id. at 254. 
20 It might be argued that, due to declaratory judgment statues in most states, state court rewriting of overbroad 
statutes is not a problem. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491(1965). After all, the ability of protected 
speakers to bring a declaratory judgment action should avert the chilling effect on its own. While this may be 
technically true, it just begs the question of whether there should exist an overbreadth doctrine in the first place, 
including at the federal level. It says nothing about the specific issue of state court narrowing. After all, there is a 
federal declaratory judgment statute as well. Hence, the particular problem of state court narrowing of overbroad 
statutes remains. 
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should we care? To date, there has been no nationwide comparative survey of such cases. A 
nationwide study of state court narrowing would be essential to determining how widespread this 
problem is, and whether it is even a problem in the first place. 
In Part II of this Article, I present the findings of a fifty-state survey of state court 
narrowing of overbreadth decisions.21 The results of that survey can be found in Appendices A 
and B. Appendix A summarizes the rules of statutory interpretation of overbroad statutes for 
each states. In all, there 21 states where judicial rewriting has occurred in at least one case that is 
still verified as good law. Such rewriting occurs according to a remarkably similar pattern: the 
court purports to follow the “legislative intent,” but broadly and artificially construes that intent 
in a way that renders it meaningless.22 An analysis of these cases reveals that worst offenders in 
this category are California and Massachusetts. The remaining 29 states, meanwhile, have never 
engaged (or no longer permit) artificial narrowing of overbroad statutes.23 Meanwhile, the states 
whose courts are most faithful in applying the overbreadth doctrine—New York and Georgia—
represent a gold standard whose example should be followed by others. These states not only 
engage in an honest analysis of a statute’s overbreadth, but actively follow Supreme Court 
precedent about what sorts of statutory language qualifies as overbroad. Many states in this 
category are not as well-behaved as New York and Georgia, in that they are quite flexible in how 
they craft saving constructions—just not in a way that can be described as rewriting the statute. I 
conclude Part II by explaining why—in light of the findings of my survey—state court 
narrowing of overbroad statutes is problematic. I do this in part by drawing on Appendix B, 
                                                 
21 See Appendix A, infra, for the complete results of this survey, as well as the methodology used to construct it. 
22 See, e.g., Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown, 624 P.2d 1215 (Cal. 1981); In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970) (in 
bank); State ex rel. The Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Winkler 777 N.E.2d 
320, 322 (Ohio App. 2002).  
23 See Part II.B.1.ii, infra. 
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which compiles various data points to show that state courts which do rewrite overbroad statutes 
hear approximately 56-59% more overbreadth cases than states which do not rewrite overbroad 
statutes. The implication here is that the judiciary’s willingness to rewrite overbroad statutes 
leads to intentionally lazy or poor drafting by the legislature, because those legislatures know 
they can always depend on the courts to save overbroad laws. 
In Part III, I conclude by offering a solution to the problem of artificial state court 
narrowing of overbroad statutes. I propose an alternative view of the overbreadth doctrine, which 
I call the “constitutionalist view” of overbreadth—which stands in contrast to the current 
“federalist” view. Under the constitutionalist view, a Supreme Court determination that a statute 
is overbroad would become a determination about whether the Free Speech Clause covers an 
ordinary citizen’s reasonable interpretation of that statute, not whether it covers the actual/proper 
meaning of the statute as construed by the state’s highest court. The standard of what counts as 
an “ordinary citizen’s reasonable interpretation” would be a question for the U.S. Supreme 
Court, analogous to other reasonableness standards found throughout constitutional law. 
Determinations of overbreadth would therefore be rooted in constitutional law and not statutory 
interpretation. A state supreme court would therefore be bound by that determination under the 
Supremacy Clause. In other words, the question of whether a state law is too broad is not a 
question about statutory interpretation; it is a question about constitutional interpretation. 
My proposed “constitutionalist view” is inspired by the New York and Georgia 
approaches to overbreadth analysis.24 As articulated by those states’ highest courts, the key 
concern motivating the overbreadth doctrine is not the authoritative interpretation of the statute, 
but rather whether an ordinary individual would reasonably read the statute in a way that chills 
                                                 
24 See Part II.B, infra. 
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his/her protected speech.25 Such a reasonableness test, as with other reasonableness tests found 
throughout constitutional law, should be considered part of the core content of the right. The 
state court’s actual interpretation of the statute, while certainly authoritative, ought to be 
irrelevant; it is the ordinary citizen’s reasonable interpretation that should matter. After all, the 
core purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to avoid a chilling effect on protected speech; how an 
ordinary citizen will reasonably interpret the wording of a statute is far more important than how 
a state court authoritatively construes it. In fact, the ability of state courts to concoct saving 
constructions actually catalyzes the chilling effect, because under such a regime no citizen can 
ever be sure that a state court will not narrow its interpretation in the future. A constitutionalist 
view of overbreadth would solve this chilling problem by removing the doctrine from the realm 
of statutory interpretation and placing it in the hands of pure constitutional law. 
II. STATE COURT NARROWING OF OVERBROAD STATUTES: A 50-STATE SURVEY 
 
As a theoretical matter, any determination that a state statute is overbroad by the United 
States Supreme Court has no permanent effect. The Supreme Court cannot actually strike an 
overbroad state law from the books, because a state court could (potentially) always craft a 
narrowing construction if it chooses. This stems from a core requirement of federalism: federal 
courts must respect state court constructions of state laws as authoritative. In fact, many state 
supreme courts have largely interpreted this inherent limitation on the doctrine as an invitation to 
                                                 
25 Fallon also observes that the chilling effect is more closely related to how the citizen construes the statute than 
how a state court construes it. “Able only to guess how a state court might respond, a citizen may hesitate before 
engaging in constitutionally privileged activity.” Fallon, supra n. 12, at 862. Though, ultimately, he is not bothered 
by this inconsistency. His motivation is to show that the Overbreadth Doctrine is not nearly as “strong medicine” as 
it is made out to be, and that this is a good thing. Id. 
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artificially craft narrow constructions of state statutes,26 when instead they should be conducting 
their own faithful overbreadth analysis.  
To be clear, this does not mean that every state engages in artificial narrowing of 
overbroad statutes. Nor does it mean that states which do engage in artificial narrowing always 
do so. A fifty-state survey on state court narrowing of overbroad statutes reveals a broad range of 
ways in how state courts respond to overbreadth challenges. This section presents the most 
important findings of that survey. The complete results of the survey, as well as the methodology 
used for it, can be found in Appendix A. 
In this Section, I sort states into two categories. The first category comprises states whose 
courts rewrite state statutes contrary to the intent of the legislature and/or plain meaning of the 
text.27 Some states are more candid about their willingness to rewrite statutes than others. But 
nearly all of these states purport to follow legislative intent, while broadly construing that 
legislative intent to their convenience. Common escape devices include “the intent of the 
legislature was to enact a valid law,”28 or “the intent of the legislature was for this court to 
uphold the law as constitutional,”29 which of course are limitless standards. Also, most of these 
states are inconsistent in the way their courts rewrite laws. Sometimes, a court in one of these 
jurisdictions chooses to faithfully uphold the meaning of the text or specific intent of the 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., Stall v. State, 570 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1990) “The Court recently recognized the continued validity of 
Justice Harlan's words in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). The statutes at 
issue are sufficiently limited, both by their terms and by common sense, to pass constitutional scrutiny.” Id. 
27 See Appendix A, infra. This category includes Alabama, Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and Wyoming. 
28 See, e.g., Kay, 464 P.2d at 150 (arguing that the "[l]egislature intended to enact a valid statute" and will rewrite 
the statute accordingly to save it from overbreadth) (cited as justification for rewriting state statutes by People v. 
Morera-Munoz, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 409, 415–16 (Cal. App. 2016), review denied (Feb. 22, 2017), and People v. 
Chandler, 332 P.3d 538 (Cal. 2014)); Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing, 137 So.2d 47, 48 (Ala. 1962) (citing the 
presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid and constitutional law, and will rewrite the statute to save 
it). 
29 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Kansas v. Nixon, No. 0516-CV25949, 2005 WL 3707407, at *4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 
Nov. 18, 2005) (“It is presumed that the General Assembly would not pass laws in violation of the constitution”).  
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legislature;30 other times, that same court creates an artificial saving construction.31 The moral of 
the story here is that the rewriting of statutes is a policy choice.  
The second category includes states whose courts do not permit rewriting of overbroad 
statutes.32 Courts in these states either 1) construe statutes according to the plain meaning of the 
text and a faithful reading of legislative history, or 2) confine themselves to the plain meaning of 
the text without considering legislative history. This divide between legislative purpose and pure 
textual analysis does not matter for purposes of overbreadth analysis: there are legitimate 
arguments on both sides about how statutes might be reasonably construed.33 The point here is 
that all of these states play by the rules, and do not invent artificial narrowing constructions to 
rescue statutes from overbreadth. A few even focus on a “reasonableness” approach 
interpretation, and peg that reasonableness to the mindset of an ordinary citizen rather than 
emphasize the “authoritative” construction by the court.34 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 919–20 (Minn. 2017) (“We begin by interpreting the statute to 
determine its meaning. We then address whether the statute prohibits speech that the First Amendment protects. We 
conclude that the statute is overbroad because it regulates some protected speech, and so we analyze whether that 
overbreadth is substantial. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the statute's regulation of protected speech 
is not substantial and therefore the statute does not violate the First Amendment on its face”). 
31 See, e.g., Matter of Welfare of S. L. J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 1978); State v. Benjamin, No. A16-0104, 
2017 WL 163715, at *5 (Minn. App. Jan. 17, 2017) (“We resolve the case before us today by assuming without 
deciding that the S.L.J. narrowing construction does apply to expressive conduct because, even on that assumption, a 
disorderly-conduct conviction may be based on conduct that has no “inextricable link” to a protected message”); but 
see State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 420 (Minn. 1998). See also State v. Benjamin, No. A16-0104, 2017 WL 
163715, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2017) (“We resolve the case before us today by assuming without deciding 
that the S.L.J. narrowing construction does apply to expressive conduct because, even on that assumption, a 
disorderly-conduct conviction may be based on conduct that has no “inextricable link” to a protected message.”) 
32 See Appendix A, infra. States that do not rewrite overbroad statutes include Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  
33 In fact, this debate between legislative purpose and the meaning of the text is a common fault line in the war 
between liberals and conservatives over statutory interpretation. This debate has been covered extensively in the 
literature, and I will certainly not attempt to resolve it here. The point is that they both are commonly accepted forms 
of statutory interpretation. 
34 See, e.g., Marquan M., 19 N.E.2d at 487 (quoting Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1169). 
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I conclude this section by highlighting some of the problems revealed by state court 
rewriting of overbroad statutes, in light of the findings of this survey. 
A. States that Rewrite Overbroad Statutes 
In this section, I examine those states whose courts rewrite overbroad legislation. Such re-
writing often follows a pattern. First, the court will explicitly declare the statute unconstitutional 
as facially overbroad. Second, the court will cite Supreme Court precedent for the proposition 
that state courts can create artificial saving constructions to rescue overbroad statutes. Third, the 
court will simply re-write the statute by adding its own language to that statute—sometimes 
candidly, other times in a deceptive way. Fourth, having rewritten the statute, the state court will 
declare it no longer overbroad, and thus unconstitutional. Finally, having found the statute 
constitutional, the state will deny the defendant’s facial challenge to the law. 
Often times, in such cases, the Court will purport to be follow the “intent of the 
legislature.”35 Make no mistake: in these cases, the court is not actually following the intent of 
the legislature except in a broad and convenient way. For instance, these states frequently assume 
that the legislature intended to enact a “valid” or “constitutional” law—which of course is a 
meaningless standard.36 Another artificial approach to legislative intent is purporting to uphold 
the “general legislative policy despite the specific intent of the legislature in drafting the statute.” 
Under this escape device, the Court essentially asks “Would the legislature want us to strike 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Jansen, 137 So.2d at 48 (citing the presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid and 
constitutional law, and so the court can rewrite the statute to save it). The Illinois Supreme Court construes statutes 
artificially and disregards specific legislative history, favoring instead a broader presumption “that the legislature did 
not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.” People v. Hunter, 986 N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. 2013).  
36 See, e.g., Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 311, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982) (The power to rewrite legislation 
exists because the court “begins with the assumption that the legislature intended to act in a constitutional manner”). 
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down the law?”37 Note that this question fundamentally different from asking “Is the law actually 
constitutional? 
1. California 
I begin with California because it is by far the most candid state when it comes to judicial 
rewriting of legislation to negate overbreadth.38 Many other states take a similar approach to 
California’s but are not as articulate about the way they narrow overbroad statutes. The current 
California rule, articulated in 1995 but cited as recently as 2014 (and by lower Courts in 2017),39 
is that courts “may reform—i.e., “rewrite”—a statute in order to preserve it against invalidation 
under the Constitution, when [the court] can say with confidence that (i) it is possible to reform 
the statute in a manner that closely effectuates policy judgments clearly articulated by the 
enacting body, and (ii) the enacting body would have preferred the reformed construction to 
invalidation of the statute.”40 California tends to apply this rule across all fields of law, but 
explicitly recognizes First Amendment overbreadth as a primary area of judicial rewriting. 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Low v. State, 580 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. App. 1991) (“We may give a narrow construction to statutes to 
save them from nullification if the construction does not establish a new or different policy basis . . . .”). 
38 See Ventas Fin. I, LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1224, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 836 
(Cal. App. 2008) (“The power of judicial reformation has typically been exercised in three categories of cases: ‘(i) 
cases concerning procedural safeguards required by the First Amendment and/or principles of procedural due 
process; (ii) cases concerning classifications underinclusive under the equal protection clause; and (iii) cases 
concerning otherwise vague or overbroad criminal statutes’”); see also Kopp v. Fair Pol. Practices Com., 11 Cal. 
4th 607, 644–45, 905 P.2d 1248, 1271–73 (Cal. 1995) (“In numerous other cases we have similarly reformed partly 
overbroad or vague statutes—and in doing so imposed what amounts to a judicial reformation of the statutory 
terms”) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil, 42 Cal.2d 823, 832-833, 271 P.2d 5 (Cal. 1954) (in bank); Kay, 
supra; In re Bushman, 1 Cal.3d 767, 773, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 (Cal. 1970); Morrison v. State Board of 
Education, 1 Cal.3d 214, 225, 232-233, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal.Rptr. 175 (Cal. 1969); Barrows v. Municipal Court, 1 
Cal.3d 821, 827-828, 464 P.2d 483, 83 Cal.Rptr. 819 (Cal. 1970); In re Cox, 3 Cal.3d 205, 223, 474 P.2d 992, 90 
Cal.Rptr. 24 (Cal. 1970); Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal.3d 138, 151, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal.Rptr. 897 (Cal. 
1973); Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal.3d 582, 598-599, 557 P.2d 473, 135 
Cal.Rptr. 41 (Cal. 1976); People v. Freeman, 46 Cal.3d 419, 424, 758 P.2d 1128, 250 Cal.Rptr. 598 (Cal. 1988)).   
39 See Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 916 (Cal. App. 2014) (Blease, Acting P.J., 
dissenting), rev’d 375 P.3d 887, 204 Cal.Rptr.3d 770 (Cal. 2016). 
40 Kopp, 905 P.2d at 1251; In re Marriage of Burkle, 135 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1068 (Cal. App. 2006) (citing Kopp, 
supra). 
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A recent ruling may help illustrate the process by which California courts artificially 
narrow overbroad statutes. In People v. Chandler,41 the California Supreme Court rewrote an 
attempted criminal threat statute to require proof that “the defendant had a subjective intent to 
threaten and that the intended threat under the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable 
person to be in sustained fear,”42 even though the Court admitted that no such requirement could 
be reasonably construed from the text or the legislative history.43 
To avoid substantial First Amendment concerns associated with criminalizing 
speech, we construe the offense of attempted criminal threat to require proof that 
the defendant had a subjective intent to threaten and that the intended threat under 
the circumstances was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained 
fear. Accordingly, when a defendant is charged with attempted criminal threat, the 
jury must be instructed that the offense requires not only that the defendant have an 
intent to threaten but also that the intended threat be sufficient under the 
circumstances to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.44 
The Court, in other words, was quite candid about why it construed the statute this artificial way: 
to avoid overbreadth problems. In fact, adding an intent scienter requirement when the legislative 
history and/or the plain meaning of the text—does not give one is one of the most common 
forms of state court rewriting of overbroad statutes.45 Of course, Courts add scienter 
                                                 
41 60 Cal.4th 508, 332 P.3d 538 (Cal. 2014). 
42 Cal. Penal Code § 422. 
43 Chandler, 332 P.3d at 539 (“For the reasons below, we hold that the crime of attempted criminal threat requires 
not only proof of a subjective intent to threaten but also proof that the intended threat under the circumstances was 
sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear.”) 
44 Id. at 548-549 (emphasis in the original). 
45 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 471 Mass. 138, 28 N.E.3d 391, 396 (Mass. 2015) (reading in a scienter 
requirement to a child sex abuse statute where there was none to avoid overbreadth); City of Montgomery v. 
Zgouvas, 953 So. 2d 434, 442–44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (rewriting an overbroad criminal statute by adding a 
specific intent requirement); State v. Morton, 91 P.3d 1139, 1141 (Id. 2004) (“To defeat a challenge of overbreadth, 
the conduct to be prohibited must, as written or authoritatively construed, be adequately defined by the applicable 
state law; the prohibition must be limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified 
age; the category of “sexual conduct” proscribed must be suitably limited and described; and, criminal responsibility 
may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant”); Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 
499, 508–09 (Ind. App. 1993) (artificially construing a Gang Statute to require that “the active member with guilty 
knowledge also have a specific intent or purpose to further the group's criminal conduct) (cited by Jackson v. State, 
634 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. App. 1994)); Wegner v. State, 928 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“We can 
discern no legislative intent to dispense with a knowledge or mens rea element in section 847.0135(2)(d). Therefore, 
based upon the offense charged in the information in this case, we construe the statute as requiring knowledge by the 
accused that the person from whom or about whom he has received the computer transmissions is a minor”). 
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requirements all the time when the legislative history and purpose reasonably indicate that the 
“omission of the element of intent in a statute, for example, may be explained by the fact that 
such culpability is so fundamental to criminal liability that the legislature must have assumed its 
requirement was obvious.”46 But there is something different—and far more troubling—about a 
court writing in a scienter requirement in spite of the legislative history for the sole purpose of 
saving the statute from overbreadth invalidation.47 Such rewriting stands in strong tension with 
bedrock principles of criminal law like fair notice,48 the rule of lenity and the legality 
requirement. Of course, those principles are not actually violated in the instant cases, because the 
defendant in such overbreadth cases already has the requisite scienter—the very fact that his 
speech is not protected anyway is precisely why he is allowed to challenge the statute as 
overbroad. And it is certainly less problematic for a court to add a scienter requirement into a 
statute rather than remove one.49 But there is still something alarming about a court being able to 
rewrite a statute so that it includes a scienter requirement, from the perspective of future would-
be defendants whose speech is otherwise protected. Such would-be speakers can no longer rely 
on a reasonable interpretation of a statute that would potentially cover their speech; they must 
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335, 
380 (2005). 
47 See id. at 380-381.  
48 There is a “fair notice doctrine” in the overbreadth realm, but as I will show in this Article, state courts do not 
respect it. See, e.g., In re Chmura, 461 Mich. 517, 541, 608 N.W.2d 31, 43 (Mich. 2000) (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. 
at 115-122). “[In Osborne,] the Court held in the criminal context that a state court may adopt a narrow construction 
of a statute in response to an overbreadth challenge and then apply the statute, as construed, to past conduct. The 
defendant must, however, have had notice, i.e., ‘fair warning,’ that his conduct was criminal…Further, the defendant 
must have been convicted under the statute as it was subsequently construed, not as it was originally 
written…Applying Osborne by analogy to the disciplinary context, we conclude that respondent had notice that he 
was subject to discipline for knowingly or recklessly using forms of public communication that were false. Canon 
7(B)(1)(d) provided that a candidate for judicial office ‘should not use or participate in the use of any form of public 
communication that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false....’ The phrase ‘knows or reasonably 
should know is false’ encompasses known false statements and those made with reckless disregard for their truth or 
falsity. Accordingly, respondent had ‘fair warning’ that his alleged conduct was prohibited by the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.” Id. 
49 See Robinson, supra n. 47, at 398 (“To eliminate intent would be ‘a feat of construction [that would] radically... 
change the weights and balances in the scales of justice,’ and would cause “a manifest impairment of the immunities 
of the individual”) (alterations in the original) (quoting Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). 
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change their behavior to conform with the looming threat of a state court artificial narrowing 
construction of that statute. The likely result is a chilling effect—the very thing the overbreadth 
doctrine was designed to avert. 
In a 2017 case, People v. Morera-Munoz,50 the Court of Appeal for the First District was 
even more explicit in its willingness to overlook the plain meaning of the text and legislative 
history, in order to give effect to the broader legislative purpose.51 In that case, the court was 
confronted with a potentially overbroad highway patrol statute which read, in part: “No person 
shall give, either orally or in writing, information to a peace officer while in the performance of 
his duties under the provisions of this code when such person knows that the information is 
false.”52 In construing the statute, the Court wrote in a materiality provision, citing the 
“mandatory presumption [that] the Legislature intends to enact a valid statute,” despite clear 
evidence in the legislative history that the “bill would make it unlawful for a person knowingly 
to give any false information to a peace officer on duty, whether or not it related to and 
materially affect[ed] the officer's duties under the Vehicle Code.”53 
California courts frequently cite In re Kay54 for the proposition that they are free to rewrite 
overbroad laws. In that case, the California Supreme Court found overbroad a criminal statute 
which had made it a crime for anyone to “willfully disturb any lawful meeting.” After finding 
that this language would clearly penalize protected First Amendment activity, the court wrote 
into the statute a requirement that the defendant “substantially impaired the conduct of the 
meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit 
                                                 
50 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409 (Cal. App. 2016), review denied (Feb. 22, 2017). 
51 See id. at 423. 
52 Id. at 415. 
53 Id. at 415–16 
54 In re Kay, 464 P.2d 142 (Cal. 1970) (in bank); 
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rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have 
known.”55 The Court, in other words, added in its own elements to the crime, including a scienter 
requirement, to save it from overbreadth. Other commonly cited cases include rewriting the 
elements of a “breach of peace” ordinance,56 a teaching license ordinance,57 and a statute 
criminalizing the disruption of “orderly operation of a college campus.”58 
Under the California rule, the court may not substitute its own policy judgements for the 
legislature’s, but it may absolutely rewrite the statute as it sees fit to give effect to those broad 
policy judgements.59 Such policy judgments include the argument that the legislature intended to 
pass a constitutional law,60 which of course is a meaningless standard that places virtually no 
limitations on the court’s ability to rewrite the statute.61 
The high water mark of judicial candor regarding state court rewriting of overbroad 
statutes is Kopp v. Fair Policy Practices Commission.62 In that case, the California Supreme 
Court proudly noted that “we have similarly reformed partly overbroad or vague statutes—and in 
doing imposed what amounts to a judicial reformation of the statutory terms.”63 The court then 
surveyed over twenty cases in which it rewrote overbroad statues—a majority of them due to 
                                                 
55 Id. at 150. 
56 See Bushman, supra (rejecting claim that the statute’s language was overbroad and criminalized protected speech 
under the First Amendment, by artificially construing the text “to mean disruption of public order by acts that are 
themselves violent or tend to incite others to violence”). 
57 See Morrison, supra (“The Education Code provided for revocation of a teaching license, on a showing of ‘any 
act involving moral turpitude.’ We found the term overbroad because it implicated protected privacy interests, and 
in order to preserve the statute, we construed it to “denote immoral or unprofessional conduct or moral turpitude of 
the teacher which indicates unfitness to teach”) (cited by Kopp, 905 P.2d at 1292). 
58 See Braxton, supra (artificially construing a penal statute “to permit exclusion from the campus only of one whose 
conduct or words are such as to constitute, or incite to, a substantial and material physical disruption incompatible 
with the peaceful functioning of the academic institution and of those upon its campus”). 
59 [A] court may reform—i.e., “rewrite”—a statute in order to preserve it against invalidation under the Constitution, 
when we can say with confidence that (i) it is possible to reform the statute in a manner that closely effectuates 
policy judgments clearly articulated by the enacting body, and (ii) the enacting body would have preferred the 
reformed construction to invalidation of the statute.’” Ventas, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 836. 
60 “We must, however, presume that the Legislature intended to enact a valid statute.” Kay, 464 P.2d at 150.  
61 See U.D. Registry, Inc. v. State, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 647, 663 (2006), as modified on denial of reh'g (Nov. 29, 2006) 
62 905 P.2d 1248 (Cal. 1995) (in bank). 
63 Id. at 1272. 
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First Amendment overbreadth. The court noted that while it might be possible to distinguish 
some cases from others (for instance, those where the court disregarded language versus those 
where the court substituted or added new language), “[i]n all practical effect in all of these cases 
we ‘rewrote’ each statute in order to preserve its constitutionality.” 64 It is important to note, 
however, that California justifies this practice in part by purporting to follow legislative intent—
though it construes legislative intent in an artificial and broad way. “We…reject the view that a 
court lacks authority to rewrite a statute in order to preserve its constitutionality…The guiding 
principle is consistency with the Legislature's…intent.65 However, whether the enacting body 
would have preferred such a reformed version of the statute to invalidation of the statute is an 
artificially broad construction of legislative intent.66  
2. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts also frequently engages in the rewriting of overbroad statutes in an overt and 
candid way. As recently as 2015, in Commonwealth v. Jones,67 its Supreme Court noted that 
artificial narrowing of admittedly overbroad statutes was not only permissible, but necessary and 
desirable. In that case, the court upheld the conviction of a defendant, under a criminal statute 
that criminalized providing a child under 14 with pornographic materials, but did not specify a 
scienter requirement.68  The court determined that the statute was overbroad because it did not 
                                                 
64 Id. at 1273; see also id. at 1284 (“When legislative…intent regarding policy choice is clear, a revision that 
effectuates that choice is not impermissible merely because it requires insertion of more words than it removes”). 
65 Id. at 1251.  In that case, the Court actually refused to rewrite the overbroad statute, because it was not consistent 
with the policy preferences of the legislature. But that is a far cry from saying the court engaged in judicial restraint. 
66 Justice Werdegar, in her concurring opinion, expressed similar concerns about broadly construing legislative 
intent to rewrite overbroad statutes. Id. at 1293 (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“I join fully in Chief Justice Lucas's lead 
opinion. I write separately to emphasize that rewriting of statutes and initiatives to salvage their constitutional 
validity, while within our authority, is a task to be undertaken sparingly and cautiously.…[T]he judicial role in a 
democratic society is fundamentally to interpret laws, not to write them…[R]espect for the limitations of the judicial 
role demands we refrain from exercising the extraordinary power to rewrite an unconstitutional law.”). 
67 28 N.E.3d 391 (Mass. 2015). 
68 See id. at 396. 
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specify a scienter requirement, and then narrowed the statute accordingly to eliminate the 
overbreadth issue. “In determining whether to construe the statute prior to amendment to require 
such knowledge, we apply two principles of statutory construction. First, a statute is to be 
construed where fairly possible so as to avoid constitutional questions. Second, where First 
Amendment rights are at issue, we presume that some form of scienter is to be implied in a 
criminal statute even if not expressed.”69 
This built on prior decisions, dating back as early as 1966 when the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Corey.70 In that case, the court explicitly overruled the 
state legislature by crafting a new scienter requirement that defied the explicit legislative intent 
of the statute.71 The Court upheld the conviction of a defendant for recklessly providing obscene 
materials to a minor, under a statute that used a broader “strict liability” standard prohibited by 
the First Amendment.72 The court acknowledged that the Legislature had the authority to define 
specify levels of intent, but also recognized that “a different situation is presented when the 
legislation is in an area where First Amendment rights are involved.”73 Specifically, the court 
held that the First Amendment requires at least a recklessness standard as to whether the child 
was a minor, “to avoid the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material.”74 
Accordingly, the court created a narrowing construction of the statute, re-writing it to require at 
least recklessness as to whether the child was a minor.75 
 
                                                 
69 Id. (citing United States v. X–Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)). 
70 221 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1966). 
71 See id. at 223-24. 
72 See id. 
73 Id. at 224. 
74 Id. 
75 See id. 
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3. Other States that Rewrite Overbroad Statutes. 
In addition to California and Massachusetts, many other states broadly define legislative 
intent in order to rewrite unconstitutional statutes.76 For instance, the rule in Ohio is that the 
Court has an “obligation” to create an a saving construction to avoid overbreadth, as long as this 
can be done “without departing too far from what the legislature sought to accomplish or what 
the statute itself can convey to a reader. Such saving constructions must be reasonably attributed 
to the legislature with reasonable fidelity to the legislature's words and apparent intent.”77 (“Too 
far” is the key phrase here.) As a technical matter, Ohio does not explicitly say that it will 
“rewrite” a statute, only that it will adopt a narrow saving construction. But the difference here is 
a matter of candor. In practice, Ohio courts are quick to add or remove language from a law 
under the guise of mere statutory interpretation. 
In a 2002 case, an Ohio appellate found overbroad and then rewrote an “expungement 
statute.”78 The statute was designed to remove from the public record allegations of criminal 
conduct against minors who have been acquitted after trial. The statute did not create an 
exception for information that would be particularly valuable to the public, which the Court 
found to be a First Amendment violation.  
We agree that unless given a saving construction, R.C. 2953.52 is not sufficiently 
tailored to protect the public's right of access to court proceedings guaranteed not 
only by the First Amendment but also by Section 11, Article I, and Section 16, 
Article I, of the Ohio Constitution (the Ohio “Open Courts Clause”). Rather than 
strike down the statute, however, we conclude that R.C.2953.52 is amenable to a 
saving construction that protects the public's right of access as well as the 
government's needs and Roach's privacy interests.79 
 
                                                 
76 See Appendix A, infra. 
77 State v. Butterfield, 874 P.2d 1339, 1348 (1994). 
78 Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.52. 
79 Winkler, 777 N.E.2d at 322. 
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In other words, rather than strike down the law as facially overbroad, the Court wrote an 
exception into the statute thus saving it from constitutional invalidity. 
Washington also follows this approach of rewriting statutes under the guise of a “saving 
construction” or “narrowing construction.” Consider State v. Johnson,80 a 2006 case in which 
that state’s Supreme Court rewrote a bomb threat statute so that it only applied to true threats. 
“Here,” the Court admitted, “the statute reaches a substantial amount of protected speech. For 
example, threats made in jest, or that constitute political statements or advocacy, would be 
proscribed…Accordingly, the statute must be limited to apply to only true threats.81 
Florida also rewrites statutes to avoid invalidity under the overbreadth doctrine, in a way 
that approaches the level of candor seen in California.82 That state’s Supreme Court believes it 
has a “duty to save Florida statutes from the constitutional dustbin whenever possible,” and has 
“done so regularly” by “rewriting” statutes.83 In one case, for instance, the Florida Supreme 
Court artificially construed a hate crimes statute to only apply to bias-motivated crimes.84 Of 
course, the Court reasoned that rewriting the statute in this way was consistent with legislative 
intent broadly construed, because it was presumed that the legislature wanted to enact a valid 
law. 
                                                 
80 127 P.3d 707 (2006). 
81 Id. at 711–12 (citing State v. Kilburn, 84 P.3d 1215 (Wash. 2004) (en banc); State v. Williams, 26 P.3d 890 
(Wash. 2001) (en banc)) 
82 “Narrowing constructions are within the Court's discretion whenever it is possible to limit the statute to what is 
constitutional, and the statute as so limited is complete in itself and consistent with…legislative intent.” State v. 
Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072, 1077 (Fla. 1994) (citing Garden v. Frier, 602 So.2d 1273 (Fla.1992); Waldrup v. Dugger, 
562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990); Firestone v. News–Press Publishing Co., 538 So.2d 457 (Fla.1989)). 
83 Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934 (Fla. 1998) (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 353 
(1995); State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1994) (rewriting Florida's hate crimes statute via narrowing 
construction); Firestone v. News-Press Publ. Co., 538 So.2d 457, 459-60 (Fla. 1989) (artificially construing 
Florida's polling place statute); State v. Elder, 382 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1980) (crafting an artificial narrowing 
interpretation of Florida's anonymous phone call statute)). 
84 See Stalder, supra (holding, via artificial narrowing construction, that the “hate crimes statute applies only to bias 
motivated crimes and, when so read, is constitutional”). 
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In some cases, a state court will add long and convoluted provisions of text to a statute.85 In 
Holton v. State,86 for instance, the Supreme Court of Alaska rewrote a penal law that 
criminalized acts “which cause or tend to cause, encourage or contribute to delinquency.”87 
Despite a finding that an honest reading of the text was overbroad,88 the statute was artificially 
construed as prohibiting speech only if it advocated “imminent lawless action” and “would be 
likely to produce such action,” and such statutory provision, when so construed, was not 
unconstitutionally overbroad.89 Of course, this language draws from the United States Supreme 
Court’s test from Brandenburg v. Ohio.90 This was a convoluted attempt to conform the statute 
                                                 
85 See, e.g., Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 43 (“Accordingly, we hold that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional 
[due to overbreadth]…Today, we [therefore] narrow Canon 7(B)(1)(d) to prohibit a candidate for judicial office 
from knowingly or recklessly using or participating in the use of any form of public communication that is false. We 
therefore amend Canon 7(B)(1)(d) to provide that a candidate for judicial office: “should not knowingly, or with 
reckless disregard, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication that is false.”); Winkler, 777 
N.E.2d at 322 (“We agree that unless given a saving construction, R.C. 2953.52 is not sufficiently tailored to protect 
the public's right of access to court proceedings guaranteed not only by the First Amendment but also by Section 11, 
Article I, and Section 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution (the Ohio “Open Courts Clause”)…Rather than strike 
down the statute, however, we conclude that R.C.2953.52 is amenable to a saving construction that protects the 
public's right of access as well as the government's needs and Roach's privacy interests. Such a construction requires 
that the trial court weigh all three factors and consider, particularly in a case of public importance, whether the 
articulated privacy interests of the person seeking expungement are sufficient to deny the public's presumptive right 
of access to court proceedings and records.”); State v. Manzanares, 272 P.3d 382, 402 (Id. 2012) (Horton, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rewriting the recruitment provision of a gang statute) (“The majority 
evidently shares my view that the Recruiting Provision does not require that the accused cause another (the 
“recruit”) to become a criminal gang member. Rather, the majority describes the Recruiting Provision as requiring 
that the recruit “actively participate” in either: (1) the criminal gang's commission of a predicate offense; or (2) 
making commission of a predicate offense one of the criminal gang's “primary activities.” However, the statutory 
definition of “criminal gang” does not provide for such a narrow construction of the Recruiting Provision”); id. at 
401 (“Unlike the majority, I am unable to discern the link between the phrase “actively participate” and criminal 
activity in the statutory scheme”). 
86 602 P.2d 1228 (Ak. 1979). 
87 See id. (Statute, which criminalized acts “which cause or tend to cause, encourage or contribute to delinquency,” 
was construed as prohibiting speech only if it advocated imminent lawless action and would be likely to produce 
such action, and such statutory provision, when so construed, was not unconstitutionally overbroad); see also 
Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351, 353–54 (Alaska 1977) (We construe the words ‘lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or 
with the body of a child’ to require physical contact of the child's body by the adult or by some instrumentality 
controlled by the adult”). 
88 “As the parties here agree, unless the bomb threat statute is given a limiting instruction so that it proscribes only 
true threats, it is overbroad…. We construe RCW 9.61.160 to avoid an overbreadth problem by limiting it to true 
threats.” State v. Johnston, 127 P.3d 707, 711 (2006). 
89 Holton, 602 P.2d at 1234. 
90 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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to First Amendment standards, because it was presumed that the Alaska legislature did not intend 
to enact an unconstitutional law.  
Other states that at least occasionally engage in some form of judicial rewriting of 
overbroad statutes include (but are not limited to) Alabama,91 Idaho,92 Illinois,93 Indiana,94 
Maine,95 Michigan,96 Minnesota,97 and New Jersey.98 For a complete list, refer to Appendix A. 
 
 
                                                 
91 See Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001). “The language in the latter 
clause of Canon 7B. (2) prohibiting the dissemination of ‘true information about a judicial candidate or an opponent 
that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable person’ is unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the 
plain effect of chilling legitimate First Amendment rights…We [therefore] narrow Canon 7B.(2) to provide that a 
candidate for judicial office shall not disseminate demonstrably false information concerning a judicial candidate or 
an opponent “with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it [is] false or with reckless disregard of whether it 
[is] false or not.” Id. 
92 See State v. Poe, 88 P.3d 704, 725 (Id. 2004) (“We have construed Idaho Code § 18–6409 and invalidated one 
part of it to eliminate overbreadth so that it conforms to the opinions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting 
the First Amendment); Manzanares, 272 P.3d at 402 (rewriting a gang statute’s “Recruiting Provision” as requiring 
that the recruit “actively participate in either: (1) the criminal gang's commission of a predicate offense; or (2) 
making commission of a predicate offense one of the criminal gang's primary activities” despite the original text and 
legislative history containing no such language).  
93 See People v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ill. 1998) (reading out language from a hunting statute requiring 
an “intent to dissuade”). 
94 See Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 508–09 (artificially construing a Gang Statute to require that “the active member with 
guilty knowledge also have a specific intent or purpose to further the group's criminal conduct); Indiana Prof. 
Licensing Agency v. Atcha, 49 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 (Ind. App. 2016) (upholding a state administrative agency’s 
artificial construction of a regulation so that it only applied to deceptive commercial speech). 
95 City of Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 659 (Me. 1985) (reading out a viewpoint discriminatory provision in 
a local ordinance to avoid overbreadth invalidation). 
96 See Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 43 (reading in an “actual malice” standard into a rule regulating judicial conduct) 
(“Accordingly, we hold that Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional…Today, we narrow Canon 7(B)(1)(d) to 
prohibit a candidate for judicial office from knowingly or recklessly using or participating in the use of any form of 
public communication that is false”). 
97 See S. L. J., 263 N.W.2d at 419 (“Since the statute does not satisfy the definition of “fighting words,” it is 
unconstitutional on its face…[However], we can uphold its constitutionality by construing it narrowly to refer only 
to “fighting words”). 
98 See Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 716 A.2d 1137, 1149–50 (N.J. 1998) (noting that in cases of 
overbreadth and vagueness, the court “has the power to engage in ‘judicial surgery,’ construing the statute in a 
constitutional way,” including the power “to excise a constitutional defect or engraft a needed meaning.”); Chamber 
of Commerce v. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 411 A.2d 168 (N.J. 1980) (rewriting a statute regulating 
election financing reporting to eliminate overbreadth); Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 331 A.2d 262 (N.J. 
1975) (rewriting ordinance requiring prior registration of canvassers and solicitors to door-to-door activity on 
private property) 
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4. Conclusions: State Court Narrowing is Problematic 
In light of the findings of my survey, we can see that state court rewriting of overbroad 
statutes is problematic in two ways. 
i. Inconsistent Application Could Lead to a Chilling Effect 
First, there is the matter of inconsistency. The ability of courts to pick-and-choose when 
to rewrite overbroad statutes injects uncertainty into the marketplace of ideas, potentially 
creating the very chilling effect that the overbreadth doctrine was designed to prevent.99 Nearly 
every state that engaged in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes has outright refused to rewrite 
an overbroad statute in at least one other case. 100  
Minnesota is one such state. Consider In the Matter of the Welfare of S. L. J.101 In that 
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a minor who had been 
convicted under a disorderly conduct statute for shouting “fuck you pig” at a police officer. 102 
To avoid overbreadth invalidity, the court artificially construed the statute, so that it only applied 
to “fighting words.”103 The Minnesota Supreme Court was quite explicit that it was rewriting the 
statute. “Although [the statute] clearly contemplates punishment for speech that is protected 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we can uphold its constitutionality by construing it 
narrowly to refer only to ‘fighting words.’”104 
                                                 
99 As one judge has noted, “[e]xcessive judicial revision of an overbroad statute may lead to vagueness problems 
because the statutory language would signify one thing but, as a matter of judicial decision, would stand for 
something entirely different. Under those circumstances, persons of ordinary intelligence reading [the law] could not 
know what it actually meant.” Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 487 (N.Y. 2014) (quoting Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1169) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
100 See Appendix A, infra.  
101 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978). 
102 See id. at 419. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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S.L.J. remains cited as good law in Minnesota,105 but courts apply it inconsistently as a 
matter of preference. In State v. Machholz,106 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to 
artificially narrow a harassment statute so that it only included fighting words. In that case, the 
defendant had been convicted under a harassment statute for shouting homophobic things while 
riding his horse through a gay pride parade on National Coming Out Day.107 After finding that 
the harassment statute was overbroad because it clearly covered expressive activity, the Court 
refused to narrowly construe the harassment statute so that it only applied to fighting words.108 
There is no way to distinguish Machholz from S.L.J., except perhaps that, for policy reasons, the 
Court did not want to invalidate this particular harassment statute for overbreadth (or did not 
want to overturn the conviction of this particular defendant). Both statutes clearly covered 
protected speech; the only issue was whether the Court chose to rewrite the statute. 
The bottom line is that these states will sometimes choose to rewrite overbroad statutes, 
and at other times will refrain from doing so; it is simply a matter of choice. Such inconsistency 
is inherently problematic. Allowing courts to pick-and-choose when to rewrite overbroad statutes 
injects uncertainty into the marketplace of ideas, creating the very chilling effect that the 
overbreadth doctrine was designed to prevent. 
                                                 
105 See Benjamin, 2017 WL 163715, at *5 (citing the S.L.J. narrowing construction as good law); cf. State v. Muccio, 
890 N.W.2d 914, 919–20 (Minn. 2017). (“We begin by interpreting the statute to determine its meaning. We then 
address whether the statute prohibits speech that the First Amendment protects. We conclude that the statute is 
overbroad because it regulates some protected speech, and so we analyze whether that overbreadth is substantial. 
For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the statute's regulation of protected speech is not substantial and 
therefore the statute does not violate the First Amendment on its face.”) 
106 574 N.W.2d 415, 420 (Minn. 1998). 
107 See id. at 420. 
108 See id. 
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ii. Judicial Rewriting Leads to Poor/Lazy Drafting of Legislation 
Second, the data confirms that when Courts show a willingness to rewrite overbroad 
statutes, they invite lazy or overaggressive drafting by legislatures who know that the courts can 
bail them out if need be. This was an oft-cited criticism of the Court’s ruling in Osborne. 
Particularly controversial was Justice White’s remark, on behalf of the majority, that  
Legislators who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without 
significant cost may not be as careful to avoid drafting overbroad statutes as they 
might otherwise be. But a similar effect will not be likely if a judicial construction 
of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the 
court. This is so primarily because the legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, 
when examined by a court, will be saved by a narrowing construction rather than 
invalidated for overbreadth.109 
More recently, the highest state courts in Texas and New York have already said as much, as 
justification for why they do not rewrite overbroad statutes.110 In his law review article published 
shortly after the Osborne case was decided, Christopher Lu observed that 
 [t]he reasoning of Osborne seems strangely at odds with Justice Scalia's opinion in 
[Massachusetts v.] Oakes, a case decided less than one year earlier. Oakes stands 
for the proposition that legislators should not be absolved from sloppy drafting by 
having a chance to amend a statute after it is challenged in court. The Osborne 
majority states, without citing any authority, that legislators will be deterred from 
such careless drafting by the fear that courts will invalidate, rather than narrow, an 
overbroad statute. This reasoning is unrealistic. Given the political nature of judges 
in most states, there is always the possibility of collusion between judges and 
legislators.”111 
The data from my survey validates this concern. Since 1992, i.e. the year after Osborne v. United 
States was decided, states which engage in artificial narrowing/rewriting have heard far more 
                                                 
109 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 121. 
 
110 See Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 339–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We may not rewrite a statute that is 
not readily subject to a narrowing construction because such a rewriting constitutes a serious invasion of the 
legislative domain and would sharply diminish the legislature's incentive to draft a narrowly tailored statute in the 
first place.”) 
111 Lu, supra n. 18,at 259-260; see also SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1290 (18th  ed., 2017) 
(questioning Justice White’s reasoning in Osborne, and strongly implying that it does not make any sense). 
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overbreadth cases (per capita) than states which refuse to rewrite.112 This indicates that 
legislatures in those depend heavily on their courts to bail them out. 
Twenty five years later, we can see that this concern was warranted. According to the 
results of my 50-state survey, the data for which can be found in Appendix B, states whose 
courts rewrite overbroad statutes hear approximately 56%-59% more overbreadth cases, 
depending on the methodology used to calculate the number.113 To arrive at this conclusion, I 
pegged the number of cases that mention overbreadth in each state to the population of that state 
(under the presumption that larger states hear proportionally more cases). Each state was then 
accorded an “overbreadth factor” based on that ratio. I then averaged the overbreadth factors for 
states that rewrite statutes and for states that do not rewrite statutes, and compared them. The 
numbers are even more striking when we look at states whose population is over 6 million (under 
the assumption that smaller states are more likely to have anomalous results).114 I summarize 
those results below: 
State Rewrites 
Statutes? 
Overbreadth 
Factor 
(Cases per million residents) 
California Y 15.9 
Florida Y 7.0 
Illinois Y 8.5 
Ohio Y 19.4 
Michigan Y 19.6 
New Jersey Y 7.7 
Washington Y 34.2 
Massachusetts Y 10.5 
Indiana Y 6.5 
Tennessee Y 6.8 
                                                 
112 See Appendix A, infra. Relatively small states which engage in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes have 
actually heard more cases than large states.  
 
113 See Appendix B, infra. 
 
114 This appears to be true based on the data. Smaller states—whether their courts rewrite statutes or not—were far 
more likely to hear more overbreadth claims, though I am not sure why. 
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Missouri Y 5.2 
   
Texas N 9.6 
New York N 4.5 
Pennsylvania N 5.7 
Georgia N 4.5 
North Carolina N 3.3 
Virginia N 6.0 
Arizona N 8.0 
 
Why are overbreadth cases far more likely to be heard in states whose courts are willing to 
rewrite overbroad statutes?  One natural conclusion is that, in those state courts where judicial 
rewriting occurs, legislatures are more likely to craft laws that are in fact overbroad, because 
they know their courts can always craft an artificial saving construction if need be. As a result, 
overbreadth issues are more likely to come before the court in those states. Of course, this is not 
the only possible conclusion, but it is certainly worth considering. 
This conclusion is even more fitting when we consider another factor, which should drive 
the numbers in the other direction. Recall that the very point of overbreadth analysis is to turn the 
defendant into a proxy for would-be protected speakers whose speech has been chilled. If 
defendants know that a state is prone to rewriting statutes to avoid overbreadth, those defendants 
(or rather, their attorneys) might be less likely to raise an overbreadth challenge in the first place. 
In other words, state rewriting of overbroad statutes renders the doctrine potentially toothless, 
because it eliminates the incentive for defendants to raise such a challenge in the first place.  
The data, however, does not bear this out. On the contrary, states courts which engage in 
rewriting are more likely to hear overbreadth cases, for the reason stated above (i.e. because state 
legislatures depend on them to bail them out). 
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B. States that Do Not Rewrite Overbroad Statutes 
While many states routinely rewrite statutes to avoid overbreadth, a majority of states 
consistently apply the overbreadth doctrine in good faith.  These states do so in at least one of 
two ways: 1) by faithfully applying the legislature’s intent by examining both the plain meaning 
of the statutory text and the legislative history;  or 2) by focusing exclusively on the plain 
meaning of the statutory text, and utilizing canons of construction to fill in any gaps. 
Two states in particular, New York and Georgia, apply the overbreadth doctrine 
especially faithfully, in a way that resembles my own “constitutionalist view” of overbreadth.115 
Other states are generally reasonable in the way they apply the doctrine, but still take advantage 
of various escape devices to avoid findings of overbreadth.116 Such escape devices cannot be 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., People v. Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 426, 437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“A sound application of these 
principles requires that I examine whether section 250.20 is susceptible of a constitutionally sound construction; one 
that is implicit in its language and manifest purpose. In this regard, requiring that the disclosures which the statute 
proscribes to be narrowly read so that the phrase “discloses such information” targets only disclosures made in order 
to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, would be consistent with the manifest purpose of the statute and 
would maintain its effectiveness”); People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 184, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733–34 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 2001) (“Moreover, the statute is capable of a reasonable limiting construction…As its history indicates, the anti-
mask law was enacted originally to prohibit wearing masks in order to prevent identification during lawless activity. 
Construing section 240.35[4] so as to prohibit the wearing of masks “for no legitimate purpose” is consistent with 
this purpose.”); Scott v. State, 788 S.E.2d 468, 474 (Ga. 2016) (adding in a mens rea element to a criminal statute 
only after concluding that it was required by a “common sense” reading of the text) (“Under our well-established 
rules of statutory construction, we presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To 
that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the 
context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an 
ordinary speaker of the English language would”), reconsideration denied (July 25, 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 
1328 (Mem) (2017). 
116 For instance, while Kansas courts will not rewrite overbroad statutes, there is nonetheless a heavy presumption in 
favor of constitutionality so long as the narrowing construction is reasonable in light of the plain meaning of the text 
or the legislative history “If there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should 
be done. A statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond 
reasonable doubt.” State v. Gile, 321 P.3d 36 (Kan. App. 2014). Louisiana follows a similar rule: narrowing 
constructions are permitted, but they must be plausible and not artificial, based on actual legislative intent or the 
plain meaning of the statute. See State v. Muschkat, 706 So.2d 429, 434 (La. 1998) (“While we recognize our duty to 
interpret statutes in a manner consistent with our state and federal constitutions, we may only preserve a statute by a 
constitutional construction provided that the saving construction is a plausible one.”); State v. Williams, 953 So.2d 
91, 102–03 (La. 2006) (noting that the court can avoid overbreadth problems “by adopting a narrowing construction 
of the statute as long as that interpretation remains consistent with the overall purpose behind the legislation.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Hawaii creates narrowing constructions (for overbreadth and otherwise) only 
when they are reasonable and consistent with legislative intent or the plain meaning of the text. See State v. 
Alangcas, 134 Haw. 515, 524, 345 P.3d 181, 190 (Haw. 2015), as corrected (Feb. 20, 2015) (“Where possible, a 
penal statute will be read in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality. To accord a constitutional 
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properly described as “rewriting” the statute, but they are still less stringent than the New York 
and Georgia tests. 
1. The Constitutionalist Approach to Overbreadth Analysis 
i. New York 
New York conducts overbreadth analysis via a combination of textual analysis and legislative 
history. Limiting constructions are faithfully applied and never abused.117  As required by the 
New York Court of Appeals, statutory interpretation begins with a textual analysis; if and only if 
that analysis does not yield an answer may legislative history be considered. Even then, any 
saving construction rooted in legislative intent must be honest, i.e. it “must be one which the 
court may reasonably find implicit in the words used by the legislature.”118 Unlike the pseudo-
legislative intent we see from cases that rewrite statutes,119 this standard is quite restrictive and 
effectively forces courts to engage in actual overbreadth analysis. When the New York Court of 
Appeals says it will construe legislative intent “reasonably,” it means it. Under this rule, lower 
New York courts are not permitted to imply broad legislative policies or simply presume that the 
legislature meant to enact a valid law.120 In other words, New York has bound itself to a 
                                                 
interpretation of a provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the 
provision to a narrow and more restricted construction. Provisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and 
reasonable interpretation under this doctrine in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results”); 
Flores v. Rawlings Co., 117 Hawai'i 153, 158, 177 P.3d 341, 346 (Haw. 2008); State v. McKnight, 131 Hawai'i 379, 
388, 319 P.3d 298, 307 (Haw. 2013). 
117 See, e.g., People v. Pierre-Louis, 34 Misc. 3d 703, 710, 927 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he 
saving construction must be one which the court “may reasonably find implicit” in the words used by the 
Legislature”); Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 487 (N.Y. 2014) (noting that if the court adopted a narrowing construction, 
“the statutory language would signify one thing but, as a matter of judicial decision, would stand for something 
entirely different. Under those circumstances, persons of ordinary intelligence reading [the law] could not know 
what it actually meant”) (citing Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1160)); Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 437; Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 
733–34. 
118 People ex rel. Morriale v. Branham, 52 N.E.2d 881 (N.Y. 1943); see also People v. Finkelstein, 174 N.E.2d 470 
(N.Y. 1961); People ex rel. Simpson v. Wells, 73 N.E. 1025 (N.Y. 1905). 
119 See Part II.A, supra. 
120 See Pierre-Louis, 34 Misc. 3d at 710 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2011). 
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reasonableness test: whether a person of ordinary intelligence reading the law and taking the 
legislative history into account would know what it actually meant.121 More importantly, New 
York cites United States Supreme Court precedent as persuasive (if not binding) in the way that 
it approaches statutory interpretation of potentially overbroad statutes.122 
A recent example of the New York Court of Appeals’ approach to overbreadth is People v. 
Marquan M.123 In that case, the Court struck found overbroad Albany County’s cyberbullying 
statute. The defendant Marquan M., a minor, had been convicted of cyberbullying other children 
via social media—an activity which all parties agreed was unprotected and within the state’s 
power to regulate, given the compelling state interest of protecting children.124 However, M. 
moved to invalidate the law as facially overbroad, because the plain language of some provisions 
in the statute went beyond the bullying of children to cover adults too—activity that, by the 
County’s own admission, was clearly protected by the First Amendment.125 The only issue was 
whether that provision could be severed from the rest of the law. The County argued it could be, 
citing the presence of a severability clause and evoking broader notions of legislative purpose; 
the defendant said severability would be practically impossible, given that the severability clause 
clearly did not cover all of the protected activity in the statute and that a plain reading of the text 
clearly indicated the legislature meant to cover the bullying of adults as well.126 
Writing for the Court, Judge Graffeo found that severability was impossible, reaching her 
decision by meticulously applying the New York rules for overbreadth analysis. “A First 
Amendment analysis begins with an examination of the text of the challenged legislation since it 
                                                 
121 See  Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 487. 
122 See id (citing Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1169 and Houston v Hill, 482 US 451, 468-469 (1987)). 
123 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014). 
124 See id. at 487-88. 
125 See id. at 487-88. 
126 See id. 
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is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the 
statute covers.”127 The text of the statute, she noted, could not be clearer. “As written, the Albany 
County law in its broadest sense criminalizes ‘any act of communicating . . . by mechanical or 
electronic means . . . with no legitimate . . . personal . . . purpose, with the intent to harass [or] 
annoy . . . another person.” On its face, the law covers communications aimed at adults, and 
fictitious or corporate entities, even though the county legislature justified passage of the 
provision based on the detrimental effects that cyberbullying has on school-aged children.”128  
In other words, the Court distinguished between the actual intent of the legislature and 
broader notions of “legislative policy”—a clear rejection of the methods used by other states who 
“rewrite” statutes to avoid overbreadth. Legislative intent, the Judge Graffeo noted, is not the 
equivalent of asking whether the legislature would want the law struck down, or whether the 
legislature intended to pass a valid law.  
It is undisputed that the Albany County statute was motivated by the laudable public 
purpose of shielding children from cyberbullying. The text of the cyberbullying 
law, however, does not adequately reflect an intent to restrict its reach to the three 
discrete types of electronic bullying of a sexual nature designed to cause emotional 
harm to children. Hence, to accept the County's proposed interpretation, we would 
need to significantly modify the applications of the county law, resulting in the 
amended scope bearing little resemblance to the actual language of the law. Such a 
judicial rewrite encroaches on the authority of the legislative body that crafted the 
provision and enters the realm of vagueness because any person who reads it would 
lack fair notice of what is legal and what constitutes a crime.129 
Having found the law overbroad and unseverable, the Marquan M. Court refused to rewrite the 
statute via artificial narrowing construction. “The doctrine of separation of governmental powers 
                                                 
127 Id. at 485 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 US 285, 293 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted). 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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prevents a court from rewriting a legislative enactment through the creative use of a severability 
clause when the result is incompatible with the language of the statute.”130  
Remarkably, Judge Graffeo also noted that the Court’s reluctance to sever the provision 
was particularly extreme in the First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness contexts. She cited 
both New York and Supreme Court precedent for the proposition that “special concerns arise in 
the First Amendment context,” i.e. concerns about a chilling effect.131 “Excessive judicial 
revision of an overbroad statute may lead to vagueness problems because ‘the statutory language 
would signify one thing but, as a matter of judicial decision, would stand for something entirely 
different. Under those circumstances, persons of ordinary intelligence reading [the law] could not 
know what it actually meant.’”132  
This line is the most important part of the opinion. What the Court did here—and in the 
other opinions that it cites—is root its rules of statutory interpretation in an objective 
reasonableness test. Such a test focuses on how an ordinary citizen would read the statute and 
whether that reading would chill speech. It is also consistent with Henry Monaghan’s 
observation that in the First Amendment context, statutes may not be as prone to severability as 
they are in other contexts.133 
Marquan M. and its predecessors identify and rectify the damage that federalism inflicts 
on the overbreadth doctrine. As I have said, the Supreme Court is powerless to excise an 
overbroad state statute from the books.134 Instead of excising the overbroad state statute from the 
books, the Supreme Court must punt the statute back to the state courts, which are free to narrow 
                                                 
130 Id. at 486 
131 Id. at 487 (citing Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1169 and Hill, 482 US at 468-469). 
132 Id. (quoting Dietze, 549 N.E.2d at 1169). 
133 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 29 (1981). 
134 See Fallon, supra n. 12, at 861-862; Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and 
Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 
381, 382 (2002); Lu, supra n. 18, at 259-260. 
 
 
32 
 
their interpretation of the state statute in question. 135  Those state courts might narrow their 
interpretation in a way that still chills speech.136 Of course, that decision is appealable to the U.S. 
Supreme Court which may then consider whether that narrow interpretation is overbroad. But 
any such subsequent determination of overbreadth by the Supreme Court is still subject to further 
narrowing by the highest state court. Ultimately, the matter is never fully settled and the scope of 
the statute is never fully certain, because the state court will always have another bite at the 
apple.137 The ex-post nature of judge-made law means that the state supreme court could always 
revise its interpretation of that statute.138 The uncertainty in and of itself produces a chilling 
effect—the very thing that the overbreadth doctrine is designed to prevent. The New York Court 
of Appeals, in respecting and faithfully applying the overbreadth doctrine, cuts off this 
uncertainty and restores the key function of the doctrine. 
 The New York Court of Appeals’ approach of binding itself to the overbreadth doctrine 
produces objectively better results than the California approach of selectively applying the 
overbreadth doctrine. Consistent application of the doctrine produces certainty that courts will 
not artificially narrow any statutes presently before the court or potentially before the court at a 
future time. Any uncertainty, meanwhile, would produce a chilling effect even in cases where the 
court ultimately decides to faithfully apply the doctrine. After all, if a state’s courts are 
inconsistent in applying the overbreadth doctrine, would-be protected speakers have no way of 
                                                 
135 See Fallon, supra n. 12, at 861-862. 
136 Id. (“The premises that underlie this third reason do not come without costs. They not only countenance but 
invite a ‘chilling effect’ whenever a statute appears to extend to constitutionally protected conduct. Able only to 
guess how a state court might respond, a citizen may hesitate before engaging in constitutionally privileged activity. 
Constitutional litigation is both hazardous and costly”). 
137 See id. As Fallon observes, “[a]ll that the Supreme Court says when it holds a state statute overbroad, and all that 
it could say, is that the statute as authoritatively construed by the state courts prior to the Supreme Court's judgment 
is too sweeping to be enforced through the imposition of civil or criminal penalties. Following the Court's decision, 
it remains within the discretion of state authorities to seek limiting constructions of the affected statute in state court 
actions for declaratory judgments.” Id. 
138 See id. 
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knowing how any case would come out. Their speech would be chilled as a result. To maximize 
the benefits of the overbreadth doctrine, states should apply it faithfully and rigorously. The New 
York approach also discourages lazy drafting of state statues, overcoming a common criticism of 
the Osborne decision.139 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the New York approach 
incentivizes defendants to raise overbreadth challenges, thereby protecting would-be protected 
speakers whose speech is chilled and thus will never have the opportunity to come before the 
Court. There would be little incentive for Marquan M. raise an overbreadth challenge in 
California or Massachusetts, whose courts are far more likely to craft an artificial saving 
construction. Those states’ courts forget to recognize the tradeoff: we allow an unprotected 
defendant to go free because it is the only remedy available to avert a chilling effect on protected 
speakers. In New York, however, the incentives are properly aligned so that unprotected 
defendants like Marquan M. have an incentive to invalidate a law, allowing him to serve as a 
proxy for chilled speakers who did not have the opportunity to come before the court. 
New York’s focus on an objective reasonableness test breathes life back into the 
overbreadth doctrine at the state level. By crafting a test based on how the ordinary citizen would 
interpret the statute, rather than a test based on how a state court may choose to interpret the 
statute, the Court of Appeals recognizes the purpose behind the doctrine in the first place. It is 
the ordinary citizen not before the court who is potentially chilled by the statute in question. Any 
                                                 
139 See Lu, supra n. 18, at 259-260. Recall Justice White’s oft-criticized observation in Osborne that “Legislators 
who know they can cure their own mistakes by amendment without significant cost may not be as careful to avoid 
drafting overbroad statutes as they might otherwise be. But a similar effect will not be likely if a judicial 
construction of a statute to eliminate overbreadth is allowed to be applied in the case before the court. This is so 
primarily because the legislatures cannot be sure that the statute, when examined by a court, will be saved by a 
narrowing construction rather than invalidated for overbreadth.” 495 U.S. at 121. The New York Court of Appeals is 
apparently well aware of this criticism, which is why it applies the overbreadth doctrine so faithfully.  
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court should therefore keep that in mind in cases of overbreadth that require statutory 
construction. 
ii. Georgia 
New York is not the only state that applies the overbreadth doctrine in such a rigorous and 
genuine way. Georgia applies the doctrine faithfully, too, but under a remarkably different set of 
rules.140 Rather than prioritize the plain meaning of the text and use legislative history and 
purpose as a fallback, Georgia employs a strict textualist approach to overbreadth analysis—and 
other areas of statutory interpretation. Under no circumstances will the Georgia Supreme Court 
consider legislative history when construing a statute.141  Instead, it limits itself to various canons 
of statutory construction when the plain meaning of the text does not yield a clear answer.142 
Legislative intent, in other words, may only be discerned from the text itself. 
Georgia’s approach to statutory construction in the overbreadth context (and elsewhere) is 
summarized in the 2017 case Scott v. State.143 In that case, the court contemplated whether to 
facially invalidate as overbroad a child obscenity statute which criminalized the offense of 
“obscene internet contact with a child.”144 The defendant Scott argued that the element of 
“contact” did not include scienter as to whether the victim was under 16.145 The State countered 
that a qualifying phrase found elsewhere in the statute (“that is intended to arouse or satisfy the 
                                                 
140 See Scott, 788 S.E.2d at 474 (adding in a mens rea element to a criminal statute only after concluding that it was 
required by a “common sense” reading of the text). See also Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172–173, 751 S.E.2d 
337 (Ga. 2013); Final Exit Network, 290 Ga. 508, 511, 722 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. 2012); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 
673, 398 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. 1990). 
141 See Scott,788 S.E.2d at 469. 
142 See id. 
143 788 S.E.2d 468 (Ga. 2016). 
144 Id. at 470. 
145 Id. 
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sexual desire of either the child or the person”) modified the element of “contact,” thus adding 
the scienter requirement.146 
Writing for the Court, Justice Hunstein began by summarizing the Court’s approach to 
statutory interpretation. 
Under our well-established rules of statutory construction, we presume that the 
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must 
afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory 
text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its 
most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language 
would. In our interpretation of statutes, we thus look to the text of the provision in 
question, and its context within the larger legal framework, to discern the intent of 
the legislature in enacting it.147 
 
Note the requirement that the Court “view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, 
and read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the 
English language would.”148 This is essentially a restatement of New York’s reasonableness test. 
The difference is that Georgia’s test is rooted in strict textualist principles while New York 
thinks that an ordinary reasonable person should consider legislative history when construing a 
statute. Both of these are reasonableness tests, the difference between them is simply a 
disagreement about what counts as reasonable. That disagreement is central to an age-old (and 
still ongoing) debate in the legal community about the proper approach to statutory 
interpretation, and I will not attempt to resolve it here. 
Applying this test to the present case, Justice Hunstein noted that while the plain meaning 
of “obscene internet contact with a child” seemed overbroad when read in isolation, other 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 472. 
148 Id. 
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subsections of the statute clarified its meaning.149 After considering and rejecting various canons 
of statutory construction, Justice Hunstein settled on an interpretation rooted in “common sense.” 
[A]spects of the structure of subsection (e) (1) and the particular verbiage of the 
qualifying phrase lead us to reject both the rule of the last antecedent and the 
series-modifier principle, in favor of a construction under which the qualifying 
phrase modifies the prohibited “contact” itself: in other words, it is the contact 
“that is intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desire of either the child or the 
person.” In reaching this conclusion, we note that the qualifying phrase appears 
after the list of four enumerated offending content categories. Were we to apply 
the rule of the last antecedent, we would read the qualifying phrase as modifying 
only “sadomasochistic abuse.” Compared to the other categories in this list—
“sexually explicit nudity,” “sexual conduct,” and “sexual excitement”—this last 
category is arguably the most egregious—involving “torture” or “flagellation”—
and certainly the most narrowly defined.150 
Having applied the scienter requirement to the element of contact, Justice Hunstein concluded 
that the statute was not overbroad and thus denied Scott’s overbreadth challenge. Note that this is 
quite different from how other states have read new elements into overbroad statutes.151 Justice 
Hunstein’s construction can hardly be construed as “artificial.” At no point does she fall back on 
the argument that the legislature clearly meant to enact a valid law.152 Her construction is 
meticulous, faithful, and convincing. 
Like New York, Georgia cites Supreme Court precedent as persuasive in reaching 
determinations about whether certain language is overbroad.  For instance, Justice Hunstein in 
                                                 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 473. 
151 Cf. O'Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 2012) (“such a limiting interpretation would effectuate the 
legislative intent to confine the prohibited speech in the act to constitutionally unprotected speech. Therefore, we 
narrow the meaning of “fear” under the act to fear of physical harm or fear of physical damage to property.”); 
Morton, 91 P.3d at 1141 (Id. 2004) (“To defeat a challenge of overbreadth, the conduct to be prohibited must, as 
written or authoritatively construed, be adequately defined by the applicable state law; the prohibition must be 
limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age; the category of “sexual 
conduct” proscribed must be suitably limited and described; and, criminal responsibility may not be imposed 
without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant.”); Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 508–09 (artificially 
construing a Gang Statute to require that “the active member with guilty knowledge also have a specific intent or 
purpose to further the group's criminal conduct) (cited by Jackson, 634 N.E.2d at 536). 
152 Cf. Jansen, 137 So.2d at 48 (citing the presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid and 
constitutional law, and will rewrite the statute to save it). 
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Scott cited to the most important federal child obscenity overbreadth cases: United States v. 
Williams,153 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,154 and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.155 
While she ultimately distinguished the present case from those cases, the mere fact that she 
found it necessary to distinguish them shows that Georgia is overwhelmingly deferential to 
Supreme Court precedent on issues of overbreadth.156 Additionally, Justice Hunstein relied on 
Supreme Court precedent in choosing a rule of statutory construction. She rejected the “rule of 
the last antecedent” canon of statutory interpretation by citing Paroline v. Unite States,157  in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court construed a qualifying clause in a manner best according with 
“common sense.”158 She also cited to United States v. Bass,159 where the U.S. Supreme Court 
declined to apply rule of last antecedent where its application would be inconsistent “with any 
discernible purpose of the statute.”160 Other Georgia overbreadth cases cite federal case law in a 
similarly persuasive way. By citing Supreme Court precedent in determining issues of 
overbreadth, the Georgia Supreme Court creates uniformity and consistency within its 
overbreadth decisions. 
                                                 
153 553 U.S. 285 (2008).  
154 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
155  521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
156 See Scott, 788 S.E.2d at 475 (“In examining the permissible breadth of a statute seeking to curtail various 
avenues of child exploitation in the digital age, we are, fortunately, not writing on a blank slate”); see also Williams, 
supra (overbreadth challenge to federal law criminalizing pandering and solicitation of child pornography); 
Ashcroft, supra (overbreadth challenge to federal law criminalizing various forms of actual and “virtual” child 
pornography); Reno, supra, (overbreadth challenge to federal statute prohibiting online transmission of “obscene or 
indecent” messages to recipients under the age of 18). 
157 34 S.Ct. 1710, 1720 (2014). 
158 See Scott, 788 S.E.2d at 473. 
159 404 U.S. 336, 341 (1971). 
160 See Scott, 788 S.E.2d at 473. 
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2. States which Interpret Overbroad Statutes Honestly but with Reasonable Flexibility 
While New York and Georgia represent the high water mark of state overbreadth analysis, 
a majority of states cannot be fairly accused of “rewriting” overbroad statutes. The other states 
differ from New York and Georgia in that they do not apply an objective reasonableness 
standard, and in that they are somewhat flexible in their approach to statutory construction. A 
comprehensive list of these states may be found in Appendix A. In this Section, I cite a few 
examples of rules from other states and explain how they are more flexible than the New York 
and Georgia rules.  
Oregon fits into this category. In 1999, its Supreme Court noted that a court may rewrite an 
otherwise overbroad statute so long as that rewriting is consistent with “the legislature’s policy 
choices, as reflected in the statute’s words.”161 This standard straddles the line between rewriting 
and being faithful to legislative intent. On the one hand, this standard is more restrained than the 
approach of “upholding any law that the legislature would want to be upheld.”162 On the other 
hand, it does push the boundaries of legitimate statutory interpretation; it allows the court to 
artificially construct specific provisions statute, but only based on hard evidence elsewhere in the 
statute that the legislature’s intent would otherwise be undermined. 
Texas observes a similar rule.163 Its courts certainly narrow statutes that might otherwise 
be overbroad, but they do it in a reasonable way that cannot in any way be described as 
“rewriting” the statute. The rule in Texas is can be summed up in a 1991 case, which remains 
                                                 
161 State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379, 385 (Or. 1999)  
162 State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 411–12, 649 P.2d 569, 575–76 (Or. 1982) (“But when such a saving 
construction cannot be attributed to the legislature with reasonable fidelity to the legislature's words and apparent 
intent, the statute is invalid as enacted, and it is immaterial whether the particular case in which it is challenged 
would be immune from a validly drawn law”); see also State v. Moyer, 230 P.3d 7 (Or. 2010); Clear Channel 
Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Portland, 262 P.3d 782, 793 (Or. App. 2011). 
163 See Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 339–40; Olvera v. State, 806 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Long v. 
State, 931 S.W.2d 285, 290 n. 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
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cited as good law to this day: “[A]though [a statute] is impermissibly overbroad on its face, we 
need not invalidate it if it is susceptible to a narrowing construction consistent with its language 
and apparent purpose.”164  Texas has clarified this rule in subsequent cases, to avoid the 
misperception that overbroad statutes may be written via artificial narrowing constructions.  
“[T]he judicial option to avoid overbreadth is not without its limits.... A court may not simply 
assume the legislative prerogative and rewrite a statute in order to save it if the statute is not 
readily subject to a narrowing construction.”165 This stands in stark contrast to Massachusetts and 
California, which seem far more willing to explicitly re-write legislation.166 But it does not 
approach the level of New York or Georgia in terms of rigor in faithfully applying the doctrine. 
III. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALIST VIEW OF OVERBREADTH 
 
In this section, I argue that the New York and Georgia approaches to overbreadth analysis 
should be used as a template for the rest of the nation. While each individual state would be well-
advised to apply the overbreadth doctrine consistently and in good faith, the real solution lies in a 
new standard to be adopted by the Supreme Court. Specifically, the Court should adopt the 
objective reasonableness test employed by New York and Georgia.167 The key concern 
motivating the overbreadth is not the “proper interpretation of the statute,” but rather “whether 
an ordinary individual would reasonably read the statute in a way that chills his/her protected 
speech.”168 Such a reasonableness test, as with other reasonableness tests found in constitutional 
                                                 
164 Morehead v. State, 807 S.W.2d 577, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (emphasis added). 
165 Id. at 581 (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.11[D] at 4-156) (internal quotations omitted). 
166 See Part II.A, supra. 
167 See Part II.B, supra. 
168 Fallon also observes that the chilling effect is more closely related to how the citizen construes the statute than 
how a state court construes it. Though, ultimately, he is not bothered by this inconsistency. His motivation is to 
show that the Overbreadth Doctrine is not nearly as “strong medicine” as it is made out to be, and that this is a good 
thing. “Able only to guess how a state court might respond, a citizen may hesitate before engaging in 
constitutionally privileged activity.” Fallon, supra n. 12, at 862. 
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law, is part of the core content of the constitutional right. The state court’s actual interpretation 
of the statute, while certainly authoritative, is irrelevant here; it is the ordinary citizen’s 
reasonable interpretation that matters. In other words, the question of whether a state law is too 
broad is not a question about statutory interpretation; it is a question about constitutional 
interpretation. 
A constitutionalist view would allow the Supreme Court to treat overbreadth more 
similarly to other prophylactic doctrines. Currently, state courts must apply Miranda and the 
exclusionary rule in their own proceedings.169 State courts must also respect the Supreme Court’s 
and subsequent interpretations and applications of Miranda and the exclusionary rule as 
particularized to new sets of facts as binding constitutional law170 (though of course the Supreme 
Court can clarify and change its own interpretations of Miranda and the exclusionary rule). None 
of this is so for the overbreadth doctrine.171 State courts are not bound by Supreme Court rulings 
on overbreadth in any practical way—they can choose when to apply it, and when not to apply 
it.172 
                                                 
169 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (ruling that the exclusionary rule is the only practical way to enforce the 
Fourth Amendment, and that it must be enforced by the states). 
170 This Article adopts David Strauss’ view that “prophylactic rules are not exceptional measures of questionable 
legitimacy but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law,” and that “constitutional law consists, to a 
significant degree, in the elaboration of doctrines that are universally accepted as legitimate, but that have the same 
‘prophylactic’ character as the Miranda rule.” David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 190 (1988) (citing Geoffrey R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and Mark V. Tushnet, 
Constitutional Law 1048 (1986); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 876-82 
(1970)). Overbreadth is one such doctrine, a prime example of constitutional common law. Matthew Adler has also 
noted that constitutional doctrine is rule-dependent.” Matthew D. Adler, Rights, Rules, and the Structure of 
Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1371 (2000). Henry Monaghan 
observes that constitutional law inherently has features of judge-made common law; it is composed of rules that 
cannot be derived by a plain reading of the text, including the Overbreadth Doctrine. See Henry P. Monaghan, 
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1975) (“Without debating the wisdom of [the 
Overbreadth Doctrine] as a matter of judicially formulated common law, I find it difficult to believe that either is a 
necessary inference from the first amendment”). 
171 A central requirement of the doctrine is that upon a determination of substantial overbreadth, the court must 
strike down the law and let the legislature rewrite it. State courts are not bound by this requirement; they are free to 
narrow the law as they choose. 
172 See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486; Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972). 
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A key distinction, of course, is that overbreadth is concerned with written statutes, while 
the exclusionary rule and Miranda rule restrict the actions of individual state actors. Written 
statutes raise the issue of statutory interpretation. Questions of statutory interpretation are 
governed by the rules of federalism. Hence, federalism prevents state courts from being bound 
by the overbreadth doctrine—the Supreme Court cannot bind state courts with a doctrine about 
how their statutes must be interpreted. The federalist view of overbreadth assumes that the 
question of whether a law is too broad is a question of statutory interpretation. If we take the 
federalist view for granted, then the current understanding of the Overbreadth Doctrine makes 
perfect sense and state courts are free to construct their own narrowing of their states’ statutes. 
But if we adopt my “constitutionalist” view of overbreadth, the federalism problem 
disappears. A determination of overbreadth would no longer be a question of statutory 
interpretation; rather it would revolve around a reasonableness test.  
Two implications would follow. First, a Supreme Court determination of overbreadth 
would definitively strike a state law from the books. The state supreme court would not have the 
opportunity to narrow its reading of the statute. Currently, state supreme courts are free to 
narrow their construction of their own states’ statutes, theoretically preventing any Supreme 
Court ruling of state law overbreadth from becoming permanent. Artificial narrowing 
constructions by the supreme courts of California and Massachusetts, for instance, would be 
subject to U.S. Supreme Court review. Second, a Supreme Court determination of overbreadth in 
one case must be respected as persuasive in deciding cases under similar laws and similar sets of 
facts. Currently, only federal courts must respect binding and persuasive precedents on what 
constitutes overbreadth; state courts do not accept, even as persuasive reasoning, what sort of 
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language constitutes overbreadth. In that respect, a constitutionalist approach to overbreadth is 
more analytically satisfying than the current federalist approach. 
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IV. APPENDIX A: 50-STATE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
 
In this Appendix, I present the findings of my 50-state survey on state court narrowing of 
overbroad statutes.  
  
My methodology consisted of targeted, organized searches on Westlaw. I began with a general 
search of the terms [“First Amendment” AND “Overbr!”] across all 50 states, which yielded 
5,553 results. I then examined the results one state at a time, using further narrowing keywords 
to identify instances where state courts discussed the prospect of narrowing overbroad statutes. 
The narrowing keywords which proved most helpful included [rewrite], [“saving constr!”], 
[“limiting constr!”], and [“constr!”]. As I read through cases, I also would eventually find 
keywords that proved unique to each state; as an example, New Jersey frequently uses the phrase 
“judicial surgery” to describe its rewriting of overbroad statutes. Of course, most of the cases I 
found cited to other cases in that state, which proved useful. Occasionally, I found decisions that 
cited to other states’ cases, which proved enormously helpful. 
   
Within any given search, I typically sorted cases by date, attempting to find the most recent on-
point case that summarized the current condition of the doctrine in any given state. If necessary, I 
would sort by relevance or by citation count. I also found it helpful to KeyCite certain cases. 
   
In the first column, I list the state and the number of overbreadth cases from my initial basic 
search of [“First Amendment” AND “Overbr!”]. In the second column, I indicate whether that 
state has engaged in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes. In the third column, I list the 
relevant case law construction pertaining to overbreadth analysis in that state. 
 
  
 
 
44 
 
STATE 
(#CASES) REWRITES? RELEVANT CASE LAW 
AL 
36 Y 
Alabama occasionally rewrites overbroad statutes. City of Montgomery v. Zgouvas, 
953 So. 2d 434, 442–44 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (rewriting an overbroad criminal 
statute by adding a specific intent requirement); Culbreath v. State, 667 So.2d 156 
(Ala.Crim.App.1995) (same as previous); Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry 
Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 218 (Ala. 2001) (artificially narrowing a canon of judicial 
ethics). 
 
See also Jansen v. State ex rel. Downing, 137 So.2d 47, 48 (Ala. 1962) (citing the 
[p]resumption…that the legislature intended to enact a valid/constitutional law, and 
will rewrite the statute to save it).   
AK 
41 Y 
See Holton v. State, 602 P.2d 1228 (Alaska 1979) (Statute, which criminalized acts 
“which cause or tend to cause, encourage or contribute to delinquency,” was 
construed as prohibiting speech only if it advocated imminent lawless action and 
would be likely to produce such action, and such statutory provision, when so 
construed, was not unconstitutionally overbroad). See also Anderson v. State, 562 
P.2d 351, 353–54 (Alaska 1977) (We construe the words ‘lewd or lascivious act . . . 
upon or with the body of a child’ to require physical contact of the child's body by the 
adult or by some instrumentality controlled by the adult.”) 
AZ 
51 N 
Arizona refuses to engage in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes. See In re 
Nickolas S., 245 P.3d 446, 450 (Ariz. 2011) (“Although courts properly construe 
statutes to uphold their constitutionality, courts cannot salvage statutes by rewriting 
them because doing so would invade the legislature's domain.”) (citing  First Natl. 
Bank of Ariz. v. Superior Court of Maricopa Cnty., 541 P.2d 392, 395 (1975)). 
AR 
18 N 
Arkansas does not rewrite overbroad statutes. Shoemaker v. State, 38 S.W.3d 350, 
355 (2001) (finding a “teacher abuse” statute overbroad and vague, and refusing to 
adopt a narrowing construction). “Were this court to read into the statute a limitation 
to “fighting words,” we would clearly be legislating in order to save the statute. This 
we will not do. Id. Cf. Bailey v. State, 972 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Ark. 1998) (“The 
doctrine of facial overbreadth should not be invoked when a limiting construction has 
been or could be placed on the challenged statute.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
 
 
 
CA 
592 Y 
California is very candid about rewriting statutes, and sometimes refers to this 
process as “judicial reformation.” Courts will presume broadly that the "[l]egislature 
intended to enact a valid statute" and will rewrite the statute accordingly to save it 
from overbreadth. In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 942, 464 P.2d 142, 150 (1970)) (cited as 
justification for rewriting state statutes by People v. Morera-Munoz, 5 Cal. App. 5th 
838, 847, 210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 415–16 (Ct. App. 2016) and People v. Chandler 332 
P.3d 538 (2014)). See also Ventas Fin. I, LLC v. California Franchise Tax Bd., 81 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 836 (2008) (“The power of judicial reformation has typically been 
exercised in three categories of cases: “(i) cases concerning procedural safeguards 
required by the First Amendment and/or principles of procedural due process; (ii) 
cases concerning classifications underinclusive under the equal protection clause; and 
(iii) cases concerning otherwise vague or overbroad criminal statutes.”) For a 
comprehensive list of older cases rewriting overbroad statutes, see Kopp v. Fair Pol. 
Practices Com., 905 P.2d 1248, 1271–73 (1995) (“In numerous other cases we have 
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similarly reformed partly overbroad or vague statutes—and in doing so imposed what 
amounts to a judicial reformation of the statutory terms) (citing City of Los Angeles 
v. Belridge Oil 271 P.2d 5 (1954); In re Kay 464 P.2d 142 (1970); In re Bushman 463 
P.2d 727 (1970), Morrison v. State Board of Education 461 P.2d 375 (1970), Barrows 
v. Municipal Court 464 P.2d 483 (1970), In re Cox 474 P.2d 992 (1970), Braxton v. 
Municipal Court 514 P.2d 697 (1973), Associated Home Builders v. City of 
Livermore 557 P.2d 473 (1976); People v. Freeman 758 P.2d 1128 (1988)))  
CO 
56 N 
Colorado relies on a combination of plain text meaning and legislative intent to 
faithfully construe overbroad statutes. “If, after examining such text and considering 
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not 
yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the 
statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we 
also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances 
surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and 
to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the 
same general subject matter.” State v. Moulton, 310 Conn. 337, 357, 78 A.3d 55, 68–
69 (2013) (When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and 
give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to 
determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to 
the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does 
apply). See also Picco v. Voluntown, 295 Conn. 141, 147, 989 A.2d 593 (2010) 
CT 
69 N 
State V. Roesch, CR94-87735, 1995 WL 356776, at *2 (Conn. Super. June 6, 1995) 
“The [Connecticut] Supreme Court has consistently held that every statute is 
presumed to be constitutional and has required invalidity to be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” Peck v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64; see also State v. Hernandez, 
204 Conn. 377, 385 (noting that “Justices Holmes and Frankfurter have said that the 
rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of 
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt 
that which will save the Act) (citing State v. Jacquemin, 196 Conn. 53, 64, quoting 
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 329, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946)) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).  
 
Cites U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding similarly worded statutes as binding 
and/or persuasive. State v. Skidd, 932 A.2d 416, 426 (Conn. App. 2007) (“Our 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. DeLoreto, supra, 265 Conn. at 145, 827 A.2d 
671, informs our analysis of § 53a–181k (a)(3). The defendant in DeLoreto 
challenged the constitutionality of one of our breach of the peace statutes, § 53a–181, 
on the ground that the statute did not limit its prohibition to “threaten[ing] to commit 
any crime against another person or such other person's property....”…In upholding 
the constitutionality of the statute, our Supreme Court emphasized that “the First 
Amendment ... permits a State to ban a true threat) (quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. at 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (“Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense 
of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or 
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death.”) 
   
DE 
22 N 
Construes statues faithfully but flexibly. All doubts are resolved in favor of finding 
the act constitutional, but such doubts cannot be artificial. Overbreadth cases in 
Delaware are extremely rare compared with other states. State v. Fantasia Rest. & 
Lounge, Inc., 2004 WL 483649, at *3 (Del. Super. Mar. 9, 2004). “There is a strong 
judicial tradition in Delaware which supports a presumption of the constitutionality of 
a legislative enactment. All doubts are resolved in favor of the challenged legislative 
act. Where a statute is challenged on the basis of vagueness and overbreadth, the 
court's first task “is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount 
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of constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge 
must fail.” 
 
United Video Concepts, Inc. v. City of Dover, 93A-10-004, 1994 WL 682321, at *3 
(Del. Super. Oct. 31, 1994), aff'd, 660 A.2d 396 (Del. 1995). “Vagueness is a concept 
that is so closely related to the issue of overbreadth that the two are very often used 
interchangeably…A statute or ordinance is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give 
a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated behavior is 
forbidden by the statute, or if it encourages arbitrary and erratic enforcement.” 
 
“[C]ourts should avoid reading statutes in ways that create such constitutional 
infirmities.” Newsom v. Biden, CIV.A. 5247-VCS, 2011 WL 835135, at *9 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 28, 2011) (citing State v. Baker, 720 A.2d 1139, 1144 (Del.1998) (“[W]here a 
possible infringement of a constitutional guarantee exists, the interpreting court 
should strive to construe the legislative intent so as to avoid unnecessary 
constitutional infirmities.”) (quoting Richardson v. Wile, 535 A.2d 1346, 1350 
(Del.1988)). 
Andrews v. State, 930 A.2d 846, 853–54 (Del. 2007) (refusing to read in a scienter 
requirement to a terroristic threats statute). 
 
State v. Huddleston, 412 A.2d 1148, 1156–57 (Del. Super. 1980) (acknowledging 
“the principle that state court construction of laws touching First Amendment 
concerns may have a narrowing and saving effect,” but referring to such power as 
“unbridled discretion” and ultimately refusing to construe a statute in an artificial 
way) 
 
See also State v. Snow, No. CRIM.A. 75-06-0040, 1975 WL 170440, at *3 (Del. 
Com. Pl. Aug. 18, 1975) (noting that in a prior case, “the ordinance before the Court 
required the alleged loiterer to move three city blocks at the request of any person and 
the requesting person did not even have to be a police officer. The ordinance in [that 
prior case] therefore was so broad that no saving construction could be given it. 
However in the case at bar the statute in question can be narrowly construed. 11 Del. 
C. § 1321(1) as narrowly construed is constitutional.) See also Town of Smyrna v. 
Torres, CRIM.A. 13782, 1975 WL 170442, at *1 (Del. Com. Pl. Apr. 4, 1975). 
FL 
131 Y 
Rewrites statutes, and is candid about doing so. Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934 
(Fla. 1998) (“[U]nlike the United States Supreme Court, this Court is eminently 
qualified to give Florida statutes a narrowing construction to comply with our state 
and federal constitutions. In fact, it is our duty to save Florida statutes from the 
constitutional dustbin whenever possible.12 We have done so regularly and with 
statutes that required far more rewriting than the present sections.13 Our reading of 
the Florida statutes today is entirely consonant with McIntyre, wherein the federal 
Court noted: “We recognize that a State's enforcement interest might justify a more 
limited identification requirement [than that of the Ohio statute].”) (citing Stalder, 
630 So.2d at 1073; Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404 (Fla.1991), L.B. v. State, 681 
So.2d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Mitchell, 652 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1995).7 
 
Richardson v. Richardson, 766 So. 2d 1036, 1041–42 (Fla. 2000). “We also recognize 
that courts sometimes apply a narrowing construction to a statute to salvage its 
validity. In State v. Stalder, 630 So.2d 1072 (Fla.1994), for example, we stated: “We 
note that in assessing a statute's constitutionality, this Court is bound “to resolve all 
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doubts as to the validity of [the] statute in favor of its constitutionality, provided the 
statute may be given *1042 a fair construction that is consistent with the federal and 
state constitutions as well as with the legislative intent.” State v. Elder, 382 So.2d 
687, 690 (Fla.1980). Further, “[w]henever possible, a statute should be construed so 
as not to conflict with the constitution. Just as federal courts are authorized to place 
narrowing constructions on acts of Congress, this Court may, under the proper 
circumstances, do the same with a state statute when to do so does not effectively 
rewrite the enactment.” Firestone v. News–Press Publishing Co., 538 So.2d 457, 
459–60 (Fla.1989) (citations omitted).” 
 
In one case, a lower court noted that the mere absence of legislative intent to the 
contrary was grounds for the court to construct an artificial saving construction. 
Wegner v. State, 928 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“We can discern no 
legislative intent to dispense with a knowledge or mens rea element in section 
847.0135(2)(d). Therefore, based upon the offense charged in the information in this 
case, we construe the statute as requiring knowledge by the accused that the person 
from whom or about whom he has received the computer transmissions is a minor.”) 
However, Florida courts are not entirely consistent in their willingness to rewrite 
overbroad statutes, and citing U.S. Supreme Court precedent as persuasive. As with 
all states that rewrite statutes, this is a matter of convenience and policy preference. 
So, sometimes Florida courts construe statutes faithfully. See, e.g., Enoch v. State, 95 
So. 3d 344, 349–50, 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“Concluding that the overbroad 
language cannot be excised without essentially eviscerating section 874.11, we are 
constrained to find it facially unconstitutional.”) (citing U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent in Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 
574–76, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500 (1987). See also State v. Catalano, 104 So. 
3d 1069, 1081 (Fla. 2012) 
(“Severing the provision from the statute would expand the statute's reach beyond 
what the Legislature contemplated. Accordingly, in striving to show great deference 
to the Legislature, this Court will not legislate and sever provisions that would 
effectively expand the scope of the statute's intended breadth.”) 
 
 
 
 
 
GA 
44 N 
“Under our well-established rules of statutory construction, we presume that the 
General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. To that end, we must 
afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory 
text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most 
natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would.” 
Scott v. State, 788 S.E.2d 468, 474 (2016) (adding in a mens rea element to a criminal 
statute only after concluding that it was required by a “common sense” reading of the 
text). 
 
 
Georgia courts also cite Supreme Court precedent as binding and/or persuasive in 
overbreadth cases. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 788 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2016) (“In 
examining the permissible breadth of a statute seeking to curtail various avenues of 
child exploitation in the digital age, we are, fortunately, not writing on a blank slate. 
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, supra (overbreadth challenge to federal law 
criminalizing pandering and solicitation of child pornography); Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coalition, supra (overbreadth challenge to federal law criminalizing various 
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forms of actual and “virtual” child pornography); Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union, 521 U.S. 844, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (overbreadth challenge 
to federal statute prohibiting online transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages 
to recipients under the age of 18))  
HI 
23 N 
Hawaii creates narrowing constructions (overbreadth and otherwise) only when they 
are reasonable and consistent with legislative intent or the plain meaning of the text. 
“Where possible, a penal statute will be read in such a manner as to preserve its 
constitutionality. To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad or 
apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the provision to a 
narrow and more restricted construction. Provisions of a penal statute will be 
accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation under this doctrine in order to 
preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results.” State v. Alangcas, 134 Haw. 
515, 524, 345 P.3d 181, 190 (2015), as corrected (Feb. 20, 2015). See also Flores v. 
Rawlings Co., 117 Hawai'i 153, 158, 177 P.3d 341, 346 (2008); State v. McKnight, 
131 Hawai'i 379, 388, 319 P.3d 298, 307 (2013). 
 
State v. Pacquing, 139 Haw. 302, 309, 389 P.3d 897, 904 (2016), reconsideration 
denied, No. SCAP-14-0001205, 2017 WL 235694 (Haw. Jan. 18, 2017) “The starting 
point for overbreadth analysis is the determination, through statutory construction, of 
the meaning and scope of the challenged statute in order to ascertain “whether the 
enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” 
Alangcas, 134 Hawai'i at 525, 345 P.3d at 191 (quoting State v. Beltran, 116 Hawai'i 
146, 152, 172 P.3d 458, 464 (2007)); see United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 
293, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (“[I]t is impossible to determine 
whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute covers.”) 
 
ID 
25 Y 
State v. Poe, 88 P.3d 704, 725 (2004). “We have construed Idaho Code § 18–6409 
and invalidated one part of it to eliminate overbreadth so that it conforms to the 
opinions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First 
Amendment…Therefore, because we have construed the statute to eliminate its 
overbreadth, we will not reverse Poe's conviction based solely upon his challenge that 
the statute is facially overbroad.”) 
See also State v. Manzanares, 272 P.3d 382, 402 (2012) (rewriting a gang statute’s 
“Recruiting Provision” as requiring that the recruit “actively participate in either: (1) 
the criminal gang's commission of a predicate offense; or (2) making commission of a 
predicate offense one of the criminal gang's primary activities” despite the original 
text and legislative history containing no such language). 
 
In 2012, a dissenting judge was especially critical of the Idaho Supreme Court’s 
willingness to rewrite overbroad statutes. State v. Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 430, 
272 P.3d 382, 402 (2012) (rewriting the recruitment provision of a gang statute).  
“The majority evidently shares my view that the Recruiting Provision does not 
require that the accused cause another (the “recruit”) to become a criminal gang 
member. Rather, the majority describes the Recruiting Provision as requiring that the 
recruit “actively participate” in either: (1) the criminal gang's commission of a 
predicate offense; or (2) making commission of a predicate offense one of the 
criminal gang's “primary activities.” However, the statutory definition of “criminal 
gang” does not provide for such a narrow construction of the Recruiting Provision.” 
Id. “Unlike the majority, I am unable to discern the link between the phrase “actively 
participate” and criminal activity in the statutory scheme.” Id. 
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Idaho courts also cite Osborne v. Ohio as an invitation to artificially narrow state 
statutes. See State v. Morton, 91 P.3d 1139, 1141 (2004). “To defeat a challenge of 
overbreadth, the conduct to be prohibited must, as written or authoritatively 
construed, be adequately defined by the applicable state law; the prohibition must be 
limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified 
age; the category of “sexual conduct” proscribed must be suitably limited and 
described; and, criminal responsibility may not be imposed without some element of 
scienter on the part of the defendant. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764–765, 102 S.Ct. at 3358, 
73 L.Ed.2d at 1127–28. In other words, statutes prohibiting the production or 
distribution of child pornography must sufficiently narrow the scope of their 
prohibitions to avoid “criminaliz[ing] an intolerable range of constitutionally 
protected conduct.” Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112, 110 S.Ct. at 1697, 109 L.Ed.2d at 110. 
 
  
IL 
109 Y 
People v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (1998) (reading out language from a 
hunting statute requiring an “intent to dissuade”) 
 
The Illinois Supreme Court construes statutes artificially and disregards specific 
legislative history, favoring instead a broader presumption “that the legislature did 
not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results.” People v. Hunter, 986 
N.E.2d 1185 (2013).  
IN 
42 Y 
On occasion, Indiana courts will artificially rewrite a statute while purporting to 
follow legislative intent or the plain meaning of the statute. See, e.g., Broadhacker v. 
City of Indianapolis, 864 N.E.2d 372, 378 (Ind. App. 2007) (“While I am certainly of 
the opinion that the government can restrict businesses from permitting people to pay 
to view or participate in live acts containing sex or violence or sexual violence or 
violent sex, the ordinance at issue herein prohibits only a live act containing both sex 
and violence. Inasmuch as we are not in the business of rewriting statutes or 
ordinances, we must apply this ordinance as drafted.” But see the opinion of Sullivan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. “I conclude that the Chief Judge does not 
adhere to his own cautionary advice and in fact does rewrite the ordinance in a 
seeming attempt to salvage the entirety of the legislation…[I]n my estimation, the 
Chief Judge takes unwarranted liberties with the language chosen by the City. He 
engrafts the word “violent” onto the phrase “live sex” acts and then in turn engrafts 
the word “sex” onto the phrase “violent acts.” He does so under the guise of honoring 
use of the conjunctive “and” between the respective phrases as set forth in the 
ordinance.” Broadhacker v. City of Indianapolis, 864 N.E.2d 372, 378 (Ind. App. 
2007) (Sullivan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Indiana Prof. Licensing Agency v. Atcha, 49 N.E.3d 1054, 1064 (Ind. App. 2016), 
transfer denied, 50 N.E.3d 146 (Ind. 2016) (deferring to a state administrative 
agency’s patently artificial construction of a state regulation so that it only applied to 
deceptive commercial speech). 
 
Low v. State, 580 N.E.2d 737, 740 (Ind. App. 3d Dist. 1991) (We may give a narrow 
construction to statutes to save them from nullification if the construction does not 
establish a new or different policy basis and is consistent with legislative intent. State 
v. Downey, Ind., 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (1985). 
 
Helton v. State, 624 N.E.2d 499, 508–09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (artificially construing 
a Gang Statute to require that “the active member with guilty knowledge also have a 
specific intent or purpose to further the group's criminal conduct) (cited by Jackson v. 
State, 634 N.E.2d 532, 536 (Ind. App. 5th Dist. 1994)) 
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Indiana courts are not as candid as other states which rewrite state statutes, purporting 
to follow legislative intent reasonably while pushing the logical limits of what counts 
as “legislative intent.” See, e.g. State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 1985)  
 
“[A] court in reading a statute for constitutional testing, may give it a narrowing 
construction to save it from nullification, where such construction does not establish a 
new or different policy basis and is consistent with legislative intent.” State v. 
Kuebel, 241 Ind. 268, 172 N.E.2d 45 (1961).  
IO 
39 N 
Iowa courts patently refuse to rewrite statutes, including in the overbreadth context. 
State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656–57 (Iowa 1973) (finding an obscenity 
statute overbroad and refusing to adopt a saving construction) (“It is not our function 
to rewrite the statute…The proper forum for the difficult task of reconstructing Code 
section 725.3 and our other obscenity statutes is the legislature. Present and future 
public policy is involved. Modern enlightened legislation is needed. Obscenity is a 
complex and difficult socio-legal problem…“If changes in the law are desirable from 
a policy, administrative, or practical standpoint, it is for the legislature to enact them, 
not for the court to incorporate them by interpretation.”) (citing Snook v. Herrmann, 
Iowa, 161 N.W.2d 185, 190) (1968) and Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 
137 N.W.2d 900, 905 (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Iowa 2007) (“[T]his court should have no role in 
upsetting this legislative choice”) (citing Zomer v. West River Farms, Inc., 666 
N.W.2d 130, 133 (Iowa 2003); State v. Wedelstedt, 213 N.W.2d 652, 656–57 (Iowa 
1973)). Nail was not a First Amendment overbreadth case but it cited to the 1973 
Wedelstedt case for this proposition, which indicates that Wedelstedt, infra, is still 
good law. 
While Iowa courts will not craft artificial saving constructions to save statutes, there 
is nonetheless a heavy presumption in favor of constitutionality so long as the 
narrowing construction is reasonable in light of the plain meaning of the text or the 
legislative history. “Challengers to a statute must refute every reasonable basis upon 
which a statute might be upheld.” State v. Nail, 743 N.W.2d 535, 539–40 (Iowa 
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
KS 
46 N 
In the overbreadth context, Kansas courts use a “common-sense interpretation when 
determining what conduct a statute potentially could prohibit and will not give 
strained meanings to legislative language through a process of imaginative 
hypothesizing. State v. White, 53 Kan. App. 2d 44, 58, 384 P.3d 13, 24 (2016) (citing 
State v. Wilson, 987 P.2d 1060 (1999)). “In other words, courts must construe 
statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results and presume the legislature does not 
intend to enact meaningless legislation.” Id. (citing State v. Turner, 293 Kan. 1085, 
1088, 272 P.3d 19 (2012)). 
 
Like Iowa, while Kansas courts will not rewrite overbroad statutes, there is 
nonetheless a heavy presumption in favor of constitutionality so long as the 
narrowing construction is reasonable in light of the plain meaning of the text or the 
legislative history “If there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as 
constitutionally valid, that should be done. A statute should not be stricken down 
unless the infringement of the superior law is clear beyond reasonable doubt.” State v. 
Gile, 321 P.3d 36 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) 
State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 921, 329 P.3d 400, 409 (2014) (refusing to find a 
sex trafficking statute as overbroad based on a common sense reading of the statute 
and a close inspection of the legislative history) 
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KY 
33 
 
N 
Kentucky does not craft artificial narrowing constructions. See Com. v. Ashcraft, 691 
S.W.2d 229, 232 (Ky. App. 1985). (“We would have to completely rewrite KRS 
161.190 in order to remove constitutionally protected speech from its purview. Such 
is not the function of this Court.”) See also See also Musselman v. Commonwealth, 
705 S.W.2d 476, 477 (Ky.1986) (“[C]learly the judiciary lacks power to add new 
phrases to a statute to provide a new meaning necessary to render the statute 
constitutional.”) 
 
 
Stinson v. Com., 396 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Ky. 2013) (refusing to craft a narrowing 
construction because “when interpreting the statutory scheme, we seek to effectuate 
the legislature's intent and “[t]he plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed 
to be what the legislature intended....) (citing Revenue Cabinet v. H.E. O'Daniel, 153 
S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky.2005)). The court went on to say that “[o]nly if the statute is 
ambiguous or otherwise frustrates a plain reading, do we resort to extrinsic aids such 
as the statute's legislative history; the canons of construction; or, especially in the 
case of model or uniform statutes, interpretations by other courts.” Id. See also 
Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky.2011) (citing MPM 
Financial Group, Inc. v. Morton, 289 S.W.3d 193 (Ky.2009)). 
 
Kentucky Registry of Election Fin. v. Blevins, 57 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Ky. 2001) 
(finding overbroad a statute making it unlawful for an employer to “give out or 
circulate any statement or report that employees ... have been requested ... to vote for 
any person ....”). In Blevins, the Court refused to deviate from the obvious legislative 
intent of the law. “Clearly, the purpose of KRS 121.310(1) is to prevent an employer 
from coercing his or her employees into voting a certain way. An employer's 
“request,” such as the one made by Blevins, may seem to be nothing more than a 
polite entreaty made upon his or her employees, or the employer only may intend 
mild persuasion. But the line between persuasion and coercion is drawn subjectively 
and depends on one's point of view. Consequently, a penal prosecution cannot 
proceed based on the perceptions of the recipient of a letter.” Id. 
 
McGinnis v. Com., 2010-CA-000893-DG, 2012 WL 28684, at *6 (Ky. App. Jan. 6, 
2012) (finding that a local ordinance was “undeniably broadly written and its 
prohibition on all amplified sound on public right-of-ways and spaces for commercial 
purposes and at all times is constitutionally suspect”, but that based on a plain reading 
of the text it was not overbroad.”) 
 
Kentucky also hints that Supreme Court precedent as binding/persuasive in similar 
cases. See Dumas v. Com., 2010-SC-000378-MR, 2011 WL 2112560, at *8 (Ky. 
May 19, 2011) (finding that a child pornography statute was not overbroad, because 
the present case was distinguishable from Supreme Court precedent)  (distinguishing 
the instant case from Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 535 U.S. 234, 122 S.Ct. 1389, 
152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002)). “[The instant case] is not strictly controlled by the Ashcroft 
decision because the language of the statute addresses possession of matter portraying 
sexual performances by minors, not virtual representations of minors.” Dumas v. 
Com., 2010-SC-000378-MR, 2011 WL 2112560, at *8 (Ky. May 19, 2011). It is 
quite telling that the court chose to distinguish Ashcroft, rather than argue (as other 
states have) that Ashcroft could be ignored because state courts can authoritatively 
construe their own statutes.  
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LA 
34 N 
Narrowing constructions are permitted, but they must be plausible and not artificial, 
based on actual legislative intent or the plain meaning of the statute. State v. 
Muschkat, 706 So.2d at 434 (La. 1998) (finding a criminal drug-traffic loitering 
statute overbroad because it prohibited clearly protected forms of First Amendment 
Activity, and also refusing to read a specific intent requirement into the law. “While 
we recognize our duty to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with our state and 
federal constitutions, we may only preserve a statute by a constitutional construction 
provided that the saving construction is a plausible one.” Id. See also State v. 
Williams, 953 So. 2d 91, 102–03 (La. 2006) (noting that the court can avoid 
overbreadth problems “by adopting a narrowing construction of the statute as long as 
that interpretation remains consistent with the overall purpose behind the 
legislation.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
State v. Schirmer, 646 So. 2d 890 (La. 1994) (finding a statute “prohibiting political 
speech within 600 feet of polling place” to be overbroad based on a plain reading of 
the text, and not considering the issue of adopting a narrowing construction). 
  
ME 
6 N 
State v. Events Intern., Inc., 528 A.2d 458 (Me. 1987) (statute regulating charitable 
solicitations was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face and hence violative of First 
Amendment) 
 
Maine has decided very few cases on the overbreadth issue, and none discuss the 
possibility of narrowing constructions.   
MD 
35 Y 
Maryland employs narrowing constructions on occasion, sometimes reasonably and 
at other times in a way that can only be described as rewriting the statute. See 
Galloway v. State, 781 A.2d 851, 862 (Md. 2001) (“In short, even if arguably 
otherwise deficient, § 123 is salvageable because we shall employ a limiting 
construction to the statute to ensure that it provides a standard of conduct and 
indicates whose sensibilities are to be offended) (citing Schochet v. State, 320 Md. 
714, 729, 580 A.2d 176, 183 (1990) (stating that “[g]eneral statutes ..., which, if given 
their broadest and most encompassing meaning, give rise to constitutional questions, 
have regularly been the subject of narrowing constructions so as to avoid the 
constitutional issues” and providing examples of such cases)). 
 
See also Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176, 184 (Md. 1990); Wilson v. Bd. of Sup. of 
Elections, 273 Md. 296, 328 A.2d 305 (1974), (rewriting a statute to avoid 
overbreadth so that the words “public funds” meant “funds of the City of Baltimore” 
and not state or federal funds); see also  Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, supra, 
317 Md. at 97–98, 562 A.2d at 732–733 (construing broad delegation of legislative 
power language to be advisory only, in order to avoid a serious issue concerning 
validity) (citations omitted); Mangum v. Md. St. Bd. of Censors, 273 Md. 176, 187–
192, 328 A.2d 283 (1974) (artificially construing the definition of “obscenity” in a 
movie censorship law so that it conformed to overbreadth requirements. 
 
See also Williams v. State, 2016 WL 3670069, at *8 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July 11, 
2016). “As our predecessors noted, “We cannot assume authority to read into the Act 
what the Legislature apparently deliberately left out…Therefore, the strongly 
preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the 
statutory text.” (citing Howard Contr. Co. v. Yeager, 184 Md. 503, 511, 41 A.2d 494, 
498 (1945)). 
 
Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Cty., 377 Md. 55, 88, 832 A.2d 170, 190 (2003) (finding 
an adult entertainment zoning ordinance overbroad, and refusing to adopt a narrowing 
construction despite the urging of a concurring judge).  
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MA 
69 Y 
Massachusetts frequently and candidly engages in artificial rewriting of overbroad 
statutes. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 471 Mass. 138, 143, 28 N.E.3d 391, 396 
(2015) (reading in a scienter requirement to a child sex abuse statute where there was 
none to avoid overbreadth). See also O'Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547 (2012) 
(“we have not hesitated to construe statutory language narrowly to avoid 
constitutional overbreadth”) (Citing Commonwealth v. Welch, 825 N.E.2d 1005 
(2005) and Commonwealth v. Templeman, 376 Mass. 533, 538, 381 N.E.2d 1300 
(1978)). 
 
Most alarmingly, Massachusetts justifies such rewriting via an artificially broad 
approach to legislative intent, presuming in the broadest way possible that the 
legislature intended to enact a constitutional law—which of course is a conveniently 
limitless standard. See O'Brien v. Borowski, 961 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 2012) 
(“such a limiting interpretation would effectuate the legislative intent to confine the 
prohibited speech in the act to constitutionally unprotected speech. Therefore, we 
narrow the meaning of “fear” under the act to fear of physical harm or fear of 
physical damage to property.”) 
  
MI 
194 Y 
Michigan courts rewrite overbroad statutes openly and without hesitation. See In re 
Chmura, 461 Mich. 517, 541, 608 N.W.2d 31, 43 (2000) (“Accordingly, we hold that 
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) is facially unconstitutional [due to overbreadth]…Today, we 
[therefore] narrow Canon 7(B)(1)(d) to prohibit a candidate for judicial office from 
knowingly or recklessly using or participating in the use of any form of public 
communication that is false. We therefore amend Canon 7(B)(1)(d) to provide that a 
candidate for judicial office: “should not knowingly, or with reckless disregard, use 
or participate in the use of any form of public communication that is false.”) 
 
People v. Cavaiani, 432 N.W.2d 409, 412 (Mich. App. 1988) (“Legislative 
enactments are cloaked with a presumption of constitutionality. Where a statutory 
provision would otherwise be unconstitutional, it is the Court's duty to give the statute 
a narrow construction so as to render it constitutional if such a construction is 
possible without doing violence to the Legislature's interest in enacting the statute) 
(citing People v. O'Donnell, 127 Mich.App. 749, 757, 339 N.W.2d 540 (1983)) This 
proposition was cited as recently as 2016, in People of City of Grand Rapids v. 
Gasper, 888 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Mich. App. 2016), though in that case the court 
ultimately refused to adopt a narrowing construction. 
Michigan cites to Osborne v. Ohio for the proposition that it may craft artificial 
narrowing constructions to save overbroad statutes. In re Chmura, 461 Mich. 517, 
544–45, 608 N.W.2d 31, 44–45 (2000) (“In Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), 
the Court held in the criminal context that a state court may adopt a narrow 
construction of a statute in response to an overbreadth challenge and then apply the 
statute, as construed, to past conduct.”) 
 
See also People of City of Grand Rapids v. Gasper, 314 Mich. App. 528, 536, 888 
N.W.2d 116, 120 (2016) 
Ordinances are presumed to be constitutional “and will be so construed unless the 
party challenging the statute clearly establishes its unconstitutionality.” Hancock, 236 
Mich.App. at 199, 600 N.W.2d 380. Further, we may apply a narrowing construction 
to an ordinance if doing so would render it constitutional without harming the intent 
of the legislative body. See People v. F. P. Books & News, Inc. (On Remand), 210 
Mich.App. 205, 209, 533 N.W.2d 362 (1995).  
 
MN 
85 Y 
Minnesota employs artificial narrowing constructions from time to time. The key case 
is Matter of Welfare of S. L. J., 263 N.W.2d 412, 419 (Minn. 1978) (“Since the 
statute does not satisfy the definition of “fighting words,” it is unconstitutional on its 
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face. Although [the statute] clearly contemplates punishment for speech that is 
protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, we can uphold its 
constitutionality by construing it narrowly to refer only to “fighting words.” Having 
narrowly construed [the statute], we must now determine whether the words “fuck 
you pigs” were “fighting words.”) (citations omitted). The S.L.J. prerogative to craft 
an artificial narrowing construction has been cited as recently as 2017. See State v. 
Benjamin, No. A16-0104, 2017 WL 163715, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2017) 
(“We resolve the case before us today by assuming without deciding that the S.L.J. 
narrowing construction does apply to expressive conduct because, even on that 
assumption, a disorderly-conduct conviction may be based on conduct that has no 
“inextricable link” to a protected message.”) 
 
See also State v. Hensel, 874 N.W.2d 245, 254–55 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) 
(recognizing the prerogative of the court to adopt a narrowing construction, but 
ultimately refusing to do so because it was not necessary in this particular case). “We 
are cognizant that some courts, including the district court in this case, have 
concluded that statutes proscribing disturbances of meetings are overly broad and 
must be accorded a narrowing construction to survive constitutional scrutiny.” Id. 
 
On occasion, Minnesota does apply the overbreadth doctrine in good faith. See, e.g., 
State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 919–20 (Minn. 2017) (“We begin by interpreting 
the statute to determine its meaning. We then address whether the statute prohibits 
speech that the First Amendment protects. We conclude that the statute is overbroad 
because it regulates some protected speech, and so we analyze whether that 
overbreadth is substantial. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the statute's 
regulation of protected speech is not substantial and therefore the statute does not 
violate the First Amendment on its face.”) 
 
MS 
31 N 
Mississippi refuses to adopt artificial narrowing constructions of overbroad statutes. 
This rule dates to 1976, when it decided ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. State, 325 
So. 2d 123 (Miss. 1976) (holding that a “statute prohibiting any motion picture 
establishment owner or operator from exhibiting any obscene, indecent or immoral 
picture” was overbroad, and refusing to ‘authoritatively construe’ the statute so as to 
confine its applicability within constitutional limits.”) ABC Interstate Theaters 
remains good law today. See, e.g., Richmond v. City of Corinth, 816 So. 2d 373, 
378–79 (Miss. 2002) (“[A] common sense reading of the statute adequately provides 
an individual of common intelligence an understanding and notice of what conduct is 
acceptable or prohibited.”) (citing ABC Interstate Theatres, Inc. v. State, 325 So. 2d 
123 (Miss. 1976)).  
  
MO 
31 Y 
Missouri does rewrite statutes on occasion via artificial narrowing constructions, 
often under the guise of following legislative intent or the plain meaning of the text. 
Like other states, it uses the escape device of presuming that the legislature intended 
to enact a law that was not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Kansas 
v. Nixon, No. 0516-CV25949, 2005 WL 3707407, at *4 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Nov. 18, 
2005). In that case, the court noted that “[a]lthough Planned Parenthood argues that 
section 188.250 restricts protected speech, it need not be invalidated in its entirety to 
pass constitutional muster. Instead, it may be upheld by a narrowing construction of 
the statute's terms “aid” and “assist” to exclude providing information or 
counseling…A narrowing construction is proper here as all statutes should be upheld 
to the fullest extent possible…It is presumed that the General Assembly would not 
pass laws in violation of the constitution…This Court gives the phrase “aid or assist” 
in section 188.250.1 a narrowed construction so as not to include speech or 
expressive conduct. As so construed, it does not bar providing information or 
counseling and does not violate the First Amendment. This narrowing construction is 
consistent with this Court's understanding that the legislature would seek to regulate 
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conduct even if regulation of speech and expressive conduct is barred by the First 
Amendment. See also National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Dir. of Dept. of Natural 
Resources, 964 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Mo. banc 1998) and Missouri Ass'n of Club 
Executives, Inc. v. State, 208 S.W.3d 885, 888 (Mo. banc 2006)).  
 
 
But see State v. Helgoth, 691 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Mo. 1985) (finding a child 
pornography overbroad and refusing to artificially construe the language). “Because 
the challenged language, under the construction given to it by the principal opinion, 
cannot be considered within the realm of child pornography, the state may not 
regulate the activity consistent with the First Amendment. If the state may not 
prohibit the dissemination of nonpornographic material, then it may not indirectly 
stop the dissemination by prohibiting production. It is not enough to say, as the 
principal opinion does, that “the statute is distinctly conduct, as contrasted with 
speech,” and that there is a distinction between production and dissemination…Such 
reasoning would have allowed a statute prohibiting James Joyce from writing Ulysses 
or prohibiting the filming of “Last Tango In Paris” or prohibiting Raphael from 
painting his madonnas with child.” Id.  
MT 
19 Y 
Minnesota rewrites overbroad statutes. See State v. Lance, 222 Mont. 92, 101, 721 
P.2d 1258, 1264 (1986) (“Although the statute uses the words “physical confinement 
or restraint,” we construe the word “restraint” to mean a “physical” restraint. The 
statute does not punish any threat to subject another to some form of mental or 
psychological restraint. Only threats to subject another to a physical confinement or a 
physical restraint are punishable.”) 
 
See also State v. Lilburn, 265 Mont. 258, 875 P.2d 1036, 1040–41 (1994) (finding 
that Montana's hunter harassment statute was overbroad, but then artificially 
construing phrase “intent to dissuade” as content-neutral to avoid overbreadth). 
NE 
17 N 
Nebraska creates narrowing constructions for overbroad statutes, but only when it is 
reasonable to do so; it does not engage in judicial rewriting. See State v. Kass, 281 
Neb. 892, 902–03, 799 N.W.2d 680, 690–91 (2011) (“A statute is susceptible to a 
narrowing construction when the text or another source of legislative intent identifies 
a clear line that a court can draw.”) In Kass, the court narrowed the language of a 
child abuse statute, but only after closely examining the legislative history and cross-
referencing various provisions of the statute to reach a reasonable conclusion. Id.  
 
State v. Hookstra, 638 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Neb. 2002) (“We conclude that the 
language of the ordinance is susceptible to construction and that the narrowing 
construction applied by the Court of Appeals was reasonable and appropriate.”) 
(citing See also State v. Edmunds, 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982); State v. 
Hicks, 225 Neb. 322, 404 N.W.2d 923 (1987); State v. Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 338 
N.W.2d 788 (1983)). 
 
 
Nebraska courts also frequently cite to U.S. Supreme Court cases as binding or 
persuasive in the overbreadth context. In fact, the Nebraska Supreme Court has 
directly compared its own standard for narrowing overbroad statutes to the (very 
strict) federal standard of “reasonable susceptibility to a narrowing construction.”  
See State v. Kass, 281 Neb. 892, 902–03, 799 N.W.2d 680, 690–91 (2011)  (citing the 
U.S. Supreme Court case of Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) 
as using a stringent standard similar to its own, with regard to how artificial 
narrowing constructions should be avoided). 
 
 
NV N In the overbreadth context, Nevada follows the rule that “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” 
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26 State v. Castaneda, 126 Nev. 478, 481, 245 P.3d 550, 552 (2010). Nevada appears to 
follow the reasonable requirement in good faith. See Scott v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 363 
P.3d 1159, 1166 (Nev. 2015) (referencing U.S. Supreme Court precedent as 
persuasive in concluding that a municipal ordinance prohibiting certain conduct 
towards police officers was overbroad, and ignoring a plea from a dissenting justice 
that a limiting construction should be adopted) (citing City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 
482 U.S. 451 (2010) and MGM Mirage v. Nev. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 209 P.3d 766, 769 
(Nev. 2009)). 
See also Star Ins. Co. v. Neighbors, 138 P.3d 507, 510 (Nev. 2006) (“If a statute is 
ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to differing reasonable interpretations, the 
statute should be construed consistently with what reason and public policy would 
indicate the legislature intended.”) 
NH 
21 Y 
State v. Theriault, 960 A.2d 687, 689 (N.H. 2008). (“If a statute is found to be 
substantially overbroad, the statute must be invalidated unless the court can supply a 
limiting construction or partial invalidation that narrows the scope of the statute to 
constitutionally acceptable applications. If, on the other hand, a statute is not 
substantially overbroad, then whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured 
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, 
may not be applied.)  
 
See also Opinion of the Justices, 128 N.H. 46, 509 A.2d 749 (1986) (holding that a 
proposed hunter harassment bill was overbroad because “critical terms” of the bill 
were not properly defined)  
NJ 
68 Y 
New Jersey rewrites overbroad statutes and actually has a nickname for this process: 
“judicial surgery.” Hamilton Amusement Ctr. v. Verniero, 716 A.2d 1137, 1149–50 
(1998) (noting that in cases of overbreadth and vagueness, the court “has the power to 
engage in ‘judicial surgery,’ construing the statute in a constitutional way,” including 
the power “to excise a constitutional defect or engraft a needed meaning.”); see also 
Chamber of Commerce v. Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 411 A.2d 168 (1980) 
(rewriting a statute regulating election financing reporting to eliminate overbreadth); 
Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold, 331 A.2d 262 (1975) (rewriting ordinance 
requiring prior registration of canvassers and solicitors to door-to-door activity on 
private property) 
 
See also State v. May, 362 N.J. Super. 572, 829 A.2d 1106 (App. Div. 2003) 
(artificially construing a child pornography statute to avoid overbreadth, by limiting 
the language as encompassing only child pornography depicting real children.”); 
Binkowski v. State, 322 N.J. Super. 359, 378–79, 731 A.2d 64, 74 (App. Div. 1999) 
(“By narrowing construction of the statute in this way we avoid the possibility of 
ensnaring a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct within the scope 
of the statute.”) 
 
 
NM 
22 N 
New Mexico does not engage in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes. Bustamante 
v. De Baca, 895 P.2d 261, 264 (N.M. 1995) (“In construing a statute, this Court 
considers the statute in its entirety, giving the words their ordinary and usual 
meaning, and determines whether a reasonable and practical construction can be 
given to the language of the statute…When a statute's language is unclear, we strive 
to give it a sensible construction and, if possible, uphold the statute.”) (citing Segotta, 
672 P.2d at 1131; James M., 806 P.2d at 1067); see also State v. Ebert, 263 P.3d 918, 
923 (2011) (refusing to write in a new element to a criminal statute, but concluding 
that this was not necessary to uphold the law anyway).  
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NY 
87 N 
New York has one of the strictest and most faithful approaches to overbreadth in the 
union. See People v. Pierre-Louis, 34 Misc. 3d 703, 710, 927 N.Y.S.2d 592, 597 
(Dist. Ct. 2011) (“[T]he saving construction must be one which the court “may 
reasonably find implicit” in the words used by the Legislature.”) 
 
People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 487 (N.Y. 2014) (noting that if the court 
adopted a narrowing construction, “the statutory language would signify one thing 
but, as a matter of judicial decision, would stand for something entirely different. 
Under those circumstances, persons of ordinary intelligence reading [the law] could 
not know what it actually meant”) (citing People v. Dietze, 549 N.E.2d 1166). The 
court added: “We conclude that it is not a permissible use of judicial authority for us 
to employ the severance doctrine to the extent suggested by the County or the dissent. 
It is possible to sever the portion of the cyberbullying law that applies to adults and 
other entities because this would require a simple deletion of the phrase “or person” 
from the definition of the offense. But doing so would not cure all of the law's 
constitutional ills. People v. Marquan M., 24 N.Y.3d 1, 10, 19 N.E.3d 480, 487 
(2014). 
 
 
People v. Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 426, 437 (Sup. Ct. 1992). “A sound application of 
these principles requires that I examine whether section 250.20 is susceptible of a 
constitutionally sound construction; one that is implicit in its language and manifest 
purpose. In this regard, requiring that the disclosures which the statute proscribes to 
be narrowly read so that the phrase “discloses such information” targets only 
disclosures made in order to obstruct, impede, or prevent such interception, would be 
consistent with the manifest purpose of the statute and would maintain its 
effectiveness.” Id.  
People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 184, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733–34 (Crim. Ct. 2001) 
(“Moreover, the statute is capable of a reasonable limiting construction…As its 
history indicates, the anti-mask law was enacted originally to prohibit wearing masks 
in order to prevent identification during lawless activity. Construing section 
240.35[4] so as to prohibit the wearing of masks “for no legitimate purpose” is 
consistent with this purpose.”) 
  
NC 
31 N 
The current doctrine in North Carolina, which prohibits judicial rewriting of 
overbroad statutes, can be traced to a 1987 case, Cinema I Video, Inc. v. Thornburg, 
351 S.E.2d 305, 331 (N.C. 1986). “The danger of allowing a local censor to impose 
his or her standard on the public is apparent. So, in responding to the felt necessities 
of the time and the stated or perceived needs of the public, the legislature must draft 
legislation whose tentacles of proscription do not exceed constitutional commands. 
Neither the trial court nor this Court should graft onto the challenged statutes judicial 
limitations that will not be apparent to the citizenry. After all, citizens should regulate 
their behavior according to the plain meaning of precisely drafted statutes, not 
according to their guesses about saving judicial construction. Id. Thornburg remains 
good law today, and this particular proposition is cited frequently in overbreadth 
cases. See State v. Fletcher, 782 S.E.2d 926 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); State v. Howell, 
609 S.E.2d 417, 422 (N.C. App. 2005) (finding a child obscenity statute 
constitutional by distinguishing the present case from Supreme Court precedent, 
rather than invoke a prerogative to craft an artificial narrowing construction) (citing 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)). 
ND 
11 N 
As one of the smallest states in the union, North Dakota’s body of overbreadth case 
law is quite small. To date, that state’s courts have not engaged in any rewriting 
overbroad statutes. See State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 435 (N.D. 2003) 
(reasonably construing a child abuse statute to include a specific intent requirement to 
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save it from overbreadth, based on a close examination of legislative history and 
cross-referencing other portions of the statute). 
 
OH 
224 Y 
Ohio rewrites statutes to avoid findings of overbreadth. See State ex rel. The 
Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Winkler, 777 
N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ohio 2002) (“We agree that unless given a saving construction, 
R.C. 2953.52 is not sufficiently tailored to protect the public's right of access to court 
proceedings guaranteed not only by the First Amendment but also by Section 11, 
Article I, and Section 16, Article I, of the Ohio Constitution (the Ohio “Open Courts 
Clause”)…Rather than strike down the statute, however, we conclude that 
R.C.2953.52 is amenable to a saving construction that protects the public's right of 
access as well as the government's needs and Roach's privacy interests. Such a 
construction requires that the trial court weigh all three factors and consider, 
particularly in a case of public importance, whether the articulated privacy interests of 
the person seeking expungement are sufficient to deny the public's presumptive right 
of access to court proceedings and records.”); but see State v. Butterfield, 874 P.2d 
1339, 1348 (Ohio 1994) (refusing to adopt a narrowing construction).  
OK 
11 N 
Oklahoma does not artificially construe statutes to save them from overbreadth. This 
rule dates back as to a 1974 that is still cited as good law today. Conchito v. City of 
Tulsa, 521 P.2d 1384, 1388 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (“In spite of the strong interest 
in construing the Tulsa ordinance to preserve its validity, we are unable to accept the 
judicial gloss suggested by the city for two reasons. First, the plain and precise 
language of the provision makes it impossible to narrow its overly broad scope to the 
prohibition of ‘fighting words' without exceeding the limits of the judicial reshaping 
of legislative enactments by substantially rewriting the ordinance. We do not confuse 
the power to construe with the power to legislate.”)  
 
 
 
Gerhart v. State, 360 P.3d 1194, 1198 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015). “In determining the 
applicability of this statute to Appellant, we are guided by certain rules of statutory 
construction. These include construing the statute according to the plain and ordinary 
meaning of its language with the fundamental principle being to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the Legislature as expressed in the statute…When our law 
punishes words, we must examine the surrounding circumstances to discern the 
significance of those words' utterance, but must not distort or embellish their plain 
meaning so that the law may reach them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
 
See also Edmondson v. Pearce, 91 P.3d 605, 639–40 (Okla. 2004), as corrected (July 
28, 2004) (“Again, respondents seek to have us construe individual statutory words in 
isolation, while ignoring related plain language of the provision. To construe § 
1692.1(B) as *640 argued by respondents is inconsistent with this Court's 
longstanding rule of statutory interpretation, which provides “[i]n the interpretation of 
statutes, courts do not limit their consideration to a single word or phrase in isolation 
to attempt to determine their meaning, but construe together the various provisions of 
relevant legislative enactments to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's 
intention and will, and attempt to avoid unnatural and absurd consequences.”) 
 
Conchito v. City of Tulsa, 521 P.2d 1384, 1389 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (refusing to 
artificially construe an ordinance so that it prohibited fighting words). 
 
OR 
70 N 
Oregon avoids artificial narrowing constructions of overbroad statutes. State v. 
Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 411–12, 649 P.2d 569, 575–76 (1982) (“But when such a 
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saving construction cannot be attributed to the legislature with reasonable fidelity to 
the legislature's words and apparent intent, the statute is invalid as enacted, and it is 
immaterial whether the particular case in which it is challenged would be immune 
from a validly drawn law.) This proposition from Robertson remains cited as good 
law today. See State v. Moyer, 230 P.3d 7 (2010); Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. 
City of Portland, 262 P.3d 782, 793 (Or. App. 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
PA 
73 N 
Pennsylvania does not artificially narrow statutes via saving constructions. See, e.g., 
Com. v. Hart, 28 A.3d 898, 911 (Pa. 2011) (“We agree with the Commonwealth that 
there is no express requirement for a conviction under Section 2910 that the 
Commonwealth also separately prove that a person who attempts to lure a child into 
an automobile did so with the purpose of harming the child. Hence, we will not 
rewrite this statute to supply such an extra component to the Commonwealth's burden 
of proof…[I]t is not for the courts to add, by interpretation, to a statute, a requirement 
which the legislature did not see fit to include.”) (citing Com. v. Wright, 14 A.3d 798, 
814 (Pa. 2011) and Commonwealth v. Rieck Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52, 59–60, 
213 A.2d 277, 282 (1965)) 
 
See also Com. v. Omar, 981 A.2d 179, 190 (Pa. 2009) (Castille, C.J., concurring) 
(“Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions, but this interpretative 
canon is not a license for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the 
legislature.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
RI 
16 Y 
Rhode Island rewrites statutes to save them from overbreadth. See, e.g., State v. 
Authelet, 385 A.2d 642 (R.I. 1978) (saving an overbroad statute prohibiting profane 
swearing by limiting its language to include only fighting words). This proposition 
was cited as recently as 2016. See State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 400 (R.I. 2015)) 
 
SC 
14 N 
South Carolina consistently invokes its prerogative to narrowly construe overbroad 
statutes, but to date it has not concocted an artificial saving construction. Disabato v. 
S.C. Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs, 746 S.E.2d 329, 333 (S.C. 2013) (“The Court presumes 
that all statutes are constitutional and will, if possible, construe a statute so as to 
render it constitutional.”) (citing Davis v. Cnty. of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 77, 470 
S.E.2d 94, 96 (1996)). See also Curtis v. State, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (S.C. 2001) 
(noting that “a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its 
repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt”)  
SD 
16 Y 
As a small state, South Dakota’s body of overbreadth case law is small. But it has 
rewritten an overbroad statute on at least one occasion. See State v. Martin, 674 
N.W.2d 291, 300 (S.D. 2003) (artificially construing a child pornography statute so 
that it did not cover “virtual” child pornography and only actual children). Cf. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002).   
TN 
43 Y 
Tennessee has engaged in judicial rewriting of overbroad statutes, though it has not 
done so recently. Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 528 
(Tenn. 1993) (rewriting a child pornography statute so that it only applied “those 
materials which lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for a 
reasonable 17–year–old minor.”). Cf. State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 161 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 2016), (“Although we sympathize with the State's argument because it is 
amply apparent that the underlying offenses in this case were gang-related, we refuse 
to read a nexus requirement into the statute to eliminate its constitutional 
shortcomings. We respect the General Assembly's efforts to combat the scourge of 
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criminal gang activity in our state, but it is not within our authority to rewrite this 
statute.”) 
  
TX 
242 N 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the court of last resort for all criminal matters 
in Texas) does not adopt artificial narrowing constructions to save overbroad statutes. 
See Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 339–40 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “The 
federal constitution affords the states broad authority to narrowly construe a statute to 
avoid a constitutional violation. We have held that Texas courts have a duty to 
employ a reasonable narrowing construction for that purpose. But this Court and the 
Supreme Court have both held that a narrowing construction should be employed 
only if the statute is readily susceptible to one. We may not rewrite a statute that is 
not readily subject to a narrowing construction because such a rewriting constitutes a 
serious invasion of the legislative domain and would sharply diminish the 
legislature's incentive to draft a narrowly tailored statute in the first place. We have 
indicated that a law “is not susceptible to a narrowing construction when its meaning 
is unambiguous.” This statement accords with our longstanding *340 practice of 
giving effect to the plain meaning of a statute unless the language is ambiguous or the 
plain meaning leads to absurd results that the legislature could not have possibly 
intended. It also accords with our more recent statements that a statute is ambiguous 
if the statutory language “is reasonably susceptible to more than one understanding.” 
Id. (citing Olvera v. State, 806 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Long v. State, 
931 S.W.2d 285, 290 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).  
 
 
UT 
27 N 
Utah does not rewrite overbroad statutes. See Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 
1377 (Utah App. 1990). “We are well aware of our responsibility to construe statutes 
and ordinances so as to carry out legislative intent while avoiding constitutional 
defects….However, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order 
to reach a constitutional construction...In light of the municipality's use of the 
expansive term “abusive language” and its express intent to penalize speech that 
merely annoys, inconveniences, or alarms persons who may not even be its targets, 
unrestricted by the addressee's likely response, we decline to narrow the scope of 
Logan City Ordinance 12–8–9(2)(D) under the guise of judicial construction….It is 
for the municipality, not for this court, to fashion a narrowly drawn ordinance that 
criminalizes unprotected speech as deemed necessary by city officials.” Id. 
 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989) (refusing to rewrite an 
overbroad statute.) “This Court seeks to construe laws so as to carry out the 
legislative intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts…However, in seeking a 
constitutional construction, we will not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain intent.” Id. 
  
VT 
27 N 
Vermont crafts narrowing constructions faithfully, consistent with either legislative 
intent or the plain meaning of the statute. See, e.g., State v. Green Mountain Future, 
86 A.3d 981, 996–97 (Vt. 2013). “Even when adopting a narrowing construction, we 
must engage in statutory construction to be sure we are not deviating from the intent 
of the Legislature…A primary method of narrowing a statute by appropriate 
interpretation is to construe it to create an objective standard. We have done that in 
cases in which we faced overbreath and vagueness challenges...We do not deviate 
from the intent of the Legislature by construing the statute before us to create 
objective standards.” Id. See also State v. Read, 680 A.2d 944, 948 (Vt. 1996); State 
v. Albarelli, 19 A.3d 130 (Vt. 2011); State v. Colby, 972 A.2d 197 (Vt. 2009); State 
v. Allcock, 857 A.2d 287 (Vt. 2004).  
VA 
48 N 
Virginia does not rewrite overbroad statutes. See Jaynes v. Com., 666 S.E.2d 303, 
314 (Va. 2008) 
 “[C]onstruing statutes to cure constitutional deficiencies is allowed only when such 
construction is reasonable. Virginia Soc'y for Human Life v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 
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814, 816–17 (1998). The construction urged by the Commonwealth is not a 
reasonable construction of the statute. Nothing in the statute suggests the limited 
applications advanced by the Commonwealth. If we adopted the Commonwealth's 
suggested construction we would be rewriting Code § 18.2–152.3:1 in a material and 
substantive way. Such a task lies within the province of the General Assembly, not 
the courts. See also Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 
901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and 
unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or 
alter its plain meaning.”); Virginia Soc. for Human Life, Inc. v. Caldwell, 500 S.E.2d 
814, 816 (Va. 1998) (“[U]nder the broader rules of statutory construction available in 
this Court we “may impose a narrowing construction upon these statutes [only] if [we 
determine] that such a construction would be correct.”  
 
 
In fact, Virginia courts also cite Supreme Court precedent as persuasive (if not 
binding) in support of this proposition. See Jaynes v. Com., 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (Va. 
2008) (“A statute cannot be rewritten to bring it within constitutional requirements”) 
(citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884–85 & nn. 49–50, (1997); Virginia v. 
American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988)). 
 
WA 
230 Y 
Washington crafts artificial narrowing constructions of overbroad statutes. See State 
v. Johnston, 127 P.3d 707, 711–12 (2006) (“Here, the statute reaches a substantial 
amount of protected speech. For example, threats made in jest, or that constitute 
political statements or advocacy, would be proscribed unless the statute is limited to 
true threats. Accordingly, the statute must be limited to apply to only true threats.”) 
(Citing Kilburn, 151 84 P.3d 1215; Williams, 26 P.3d 890).  
 
State v. Pauling, 149 Wash. 2d 381, 391, 69 P.3d 331, 336 (2003). “Here, limiting 
extortion to threats lacking a nexus between the threat and its objective would restrict 
application of the law to “inherently wrongful” threats. We therefore disagree with 
the Court of Appeals and hold that it is unnecessary to strike former RCW 9A.56.130 
because we may impose a limiting construction in the form of a requirement that 
there be a “lack of nexus” that limits its application to only unprotected speech.” 
 
Interestingly enough, in some cases Washington cites Supreme Court precedent as 
persuasive (if not outright binding) in overbreadth cases. State v. Strong, 272 P.3d 
281, 285 (Wash. App. Div. 3 2012) “But adopting a limiting construction is only 
appropriate if the statute is readily susceptible to the limiting construction; rewriting a 
law to conform it to constitutional requirements would constitute a serious invasion 
of the *213 legislative domain.”) (citing Stevens, 130 S.Ct. at 1592, Reno v. Am. Civil 
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997); United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. 
Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995)). 
WV 
6 N 
West Virginia does not rewrite overbroad statutes. See Fisher v. City of Charleston, 
425 S.E.2d 194, 201–02 (W. Va. 1992) (“Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ 
of mandamus and rule that the City of Charleston Zoning Ordinances §§ 18-1-1 and 
21-10 are unconstitutionally overbroad in forbidding temporary candidate or political 
signs, and that the Zoning Board of Appeals erred in denying the petitioner's 
application. It is up to the Charleston City Council to rewrite a narrowly tailored 
zoning ordinance dealing with temporary political or candidate signs, in accordance 
with the provisions set forth in this opinion.”) 
 
 
WI N Wisconsin crafts narrowing constructions of overbroad statutes, but in a faithful way that cannot be described as “rewriting.” See State v. Bagley, 474 N.W.2d 761 (Wisc. 
 
 
62 
 
98 Ct.App.1991) (holding Wisconsin's hunter harassment statute constitutional on 
facial overbreadth challenge). “[A] court can by a process of judicial construction 
apply a statute, which appears to sweep too widely on its face, to non-speech related 
conduct. First, we look to the language of the statute to determine whether on its face 
it applies to conduct protected by the first amendment. Id. 
See also City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 227–28, 466 N.W.2d 861, 
868–69 (1991) (“Additionally, there are cases where an ordinance may on its face 
appear to sweep too widely, but by a process of judicial construction, a state court 
might conclude that, on the basis of legislative history and examination of the 
verbiage, the enactment can be applied constitutionally to nonspeech-related conduct. 
We know nothing of the legislative history, the particular facts, or societal problems 
that impelled the passage of the Milwaukee ordinance. We must therefore appraise 
this ordinance13 on the basis of its language alone.”) 
 
 
WY 
9 Y 
 
See Weaver v. Shaffer, 290 S.E.2d 244 (W. Va. 1980) (artificially construing a statute 
prohibiting political activities by civil servants so that it proscribed “only those 
political activities which the Supreme Court has decided…may constitutionally be 
proscribed.” See also Id. at 253 (Caplan, J., dissenting) (“The Court here is not 
merely involved in interpreting or construing the statute. The majority clearly has 
undertaken the task of judicial legislating.”) Justice Caplan went on to note that “[t]he 
legislature, not this Court, is entrusted with the duty of balancing the extent of the 
guarantees of freedom against the need for orderly management, integrity and 
competency of classified employees. A wholesale ban on all political activity does 
not meet the standards of precision necessary in drafting restrictions on First 
Amendment rights. There is no apparent attempt by the legislature to balance a 
deputy sheriff's right to participate in political expression against the government's 
interest in maintaining non-political law enforcement. The proper inquiry is a 
balancing of government needs and private rights. A rewriting of W.Va.Code, 1931, 
7–14–15(a), as amended, must be based on a detailed determination of what dangers 
the State seeks to control and of what rights it must guarantee. Such task is a valid 
exercise of legislative, not judicial, authority. 
 
But see In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728, 756 (Wyo. 2017) (“The legislature, not this Court, 
wrote § 20-1-106(a) and determines who can perform marriages and whether any 
particular class of officiant is required to do so. It is not appropriate for this Court to 
attempt to re-write this statute. (citing Horning v. Penrose Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 
2014 WY 133, ¶ 18, 336 P.3d 151, 155 (Wyo. 2014) (“We are not at liberty to rewrite 
a statute under the guise of statutory interpretation or impose a meaning beyond its 
unambiguous language.”) Neely is not an overbreadth case, so it is not safe to say that 
the Court  
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V. APPENDIX B: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUDICIAL REWRITING AND THE FREQUENCY 
OF OVERBREADTH CASES 
 
In this Appendix, I present some important empirical findings my 50-state survey on state court 
narrowing of overbroad statutes. The point of this section was is to figure out whether state 
courts that rewrite overbroad statutes hear more overbreadth challenges than states that do not 
rewrite. Put another way, the point was to learn whether any given overbreadth case is more 
likely to be heard in a state whose courts rewrite statutes versus a state whose courts do not. 
  
To compile this data, I searched the terms [“First Amendment” AND “Overbr!”] across all 50 
states since 1992 (the year after Osborne v. Ohio was decided, since the point is to figure out 
whether that decision has led to legislatures drafting intentionally overbroad legislation under the 
presumption that the courts will bail them out if need be). I then identified the number of cases in 
each state, as provided by Westlaw. While this methodology is certainly not precise in that it also 
captured cases that merely mention the overbreadth doctrine, the presumption is that these 
imperfections should be relatively smooth across all fifty states. 
 
After counting the number of cases in each state, I then pegged that number to the population in 
each state according to the 2010 census (again, not precise in that the data goes as back far as 
1992, but with the presumption that any imperfections should be relatively minor and smoothed 
evenly across the fifty states). I called this the “Weighted Average.” (i.e. total number of cases 
divided by total state population). I also compiled a non-weighted average, which does not take 
state population into account (i.e. [number of cases/population] for each state, added together, 
divided by the number of states). For that category, however, I eliminated states whose 
population was under one million, under the presumption that data from the smallest states was 
more likely to be anomalous. 
 
I present my findings below, ranked first according to whether the state rewrites overbroad 
statutes, and then according to population. 
 
 
 
State Rewrites 
Statutes? 
Overbreadth 
Factor 
(Cases per million 
residents) 
Number 
of Cases 
Population 
(millions, 
2010) 
.California Y 15.9 592 37.3 
.Florida Y 7.0 131 18.8 
.Illinois Y 8.5 109 12.8 
.Ohio Y 19.4 224 11.5 
.Michigan Y 19.6 194 9.9 
.New Jersey Y 7.7 68 8.8 
.Washington Y 34.2 230 6.7 
.Massachusetts Y 10.5 69 6.5 
.Indiana Y 6.5 42 6.5 
.Tennessee Y 6.8 43 6.3 
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.Missouri Y 5.2 31 6.0 
.Maryland Y 6.1 35 5.8 
.Minnesota Y 16.0 85 5.3 
.Alabama Y 7.5 36 4.8 
.Idaho Y 15.9 25 1.6 
.New Hampshire Y 16.0 21 1.3 
.Rhode Island Y 15.2 16 1.1 
.Montana Y 19.2 19 1.0 
.South Dakota Y 19.7 16 0.8 
.Alaska Y 57.7 41 0.7 
.Wyoming Y 16.0 9 0.6 
     
.Texas N 9.6 242 25.1 
.New York N 4.5 87 19.4 
.Pennsylvania N 5.7 73 12.7 
.Georgia N 4.5 44 9.7 
.North Carolina N 3.3 31 9.5 
.Virginia N 6.0 48 8.0 
.Arizona N 8.0 51 6.4 
.Wisconsin N 17.2 98 5.7 
.Colorado N 11.1 56 5.0 
.South Carolina N 3.0 14 4.6 
.Louisiana N 7.5 34 4.5 
.Kentucky N 7.6 33 4.3 
.Oregon N 18.3 70 3.8 
.Oklahoma N 2.9 11 3.8 
.Connecticut N 19.3 69 3.6 
.Iowa N 12.8 39 3.0 
.Mississippi N 10.4 31 3.0 
.Arkansas N 6.2 18 2.9 
.Kansas N 16.1 46 2.9 
.Utah N 9.8 27 2.8 
.Nevada N 9.6 26 2.7 
.New Mexico N 10.7 22 2.1 
.West Virginia N 3.2 6 1.9 
.Nebraska N 9.3 17 1.8 
.Hawaii N 16.9 23 1.4 
.Maine N 4.5 6 1.3 
.Delaware N 24.5 22 0.9 
.North Dakota N 16.4 11 0.7 
.Vermont N 43.1 27 0.6  
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Y:N 
Weighted Average 
  
13.2:8.3 
 
(States that rewrite 
hear 59% more 
overbreadth 
challenges than states 
that do not) 
 
  
Y:N  
Non-Weighted Average 
(minus states < 1M pop.) 
  
14.3:9.1 
 
(States that rewrite 
hear 56% more 
overbreadth 
challenges than states 
that do not) 
  
  
 
